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Security analysis of ε-almost dual universal2 hash
functions: smoothing of min entropy vs. smoothing
of Re´nyi entropy of order 2
Masahito Hayashi
Abstract
Recently, ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions has been proposed as a new and wider class of hash functions. Using this
class of hash functions, several efficient hash functions were proposed. This paper evaluates the security performance when we
apply this kind of hash functions. We evaluate the security in several kinds of setting based on the L1 distinguishability criterion
and the modified mutual information criterion. The obtained evaluation is based on smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2 and/or
min entropy. We clarify the difference between these two methods.
Index Terms
ε-almost dual universal2 hash function, secret key generation, exponential decreasing rate, single-shot setting, equivocation
rate
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Tight exponential evaluation of L1 distinguishability under ε-almost dual universality2
Secure key generation is an important problem in information theoretic security. When a part of keys are leaked to a third
party, we cannot use the key. In this case, we need to apply a hash function to the keys. Bennett et al. [4] and Ha˚stad et al. [15]
proposed to use universal2 hash functions for privacy amplification and derived two universal hashing lemma, which provides
an upper bound for leaked information based on Re´nyi entropy of order 2. Two universal hashing lemma can guarantee the
security only when the length of the generated keys is less than Re´nyi entropy of order 2. In order to resolve this drawback,
Renner [16] attached the smoothing to min entropy, which is a lower bound of conditional Re´nyi entropy of order 2. The
smoothing is the method to replace the true distribution by a good distribution that approximates the true distribution. This
method works well when the security is evaluated variational distance between the real distribution and the ideal distribution,
which is often called the L1 distinguishability criterion.
Now, we consider the case when a random variable A leaked to the third party E is given as n-fold independent and
identical distribution [7], [6]. Under this setting, the optimal asymptotic secure key generation rate is the conditional entropy
[7], [6]. The smoothing to min entropy shows that universal2 hash functions asymptotically achieves the conditional entropy
date. When the key generation rate is smaller than the conditional entropy date, the L1 distinguishability criterion goes to zero
exponentially. The previous paper [12] derived an exponentially decreasing rate under the universality2. Its tightness was also
shown in [36]. Note that the importance of exponentially decreasing rate has been explained in the previous papers [12], [56].
Recently, Tsurumaru et al.[14] proposed to use ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions, which is a generalization of liner
universal2 hash functions, and obtained a different version of two universal hashing lemma for this class of hash functions.
Further, the recent paper [33] proposed several practical hash functions under the condition of the ε-almost dual universality2.
The hash functions [33] have a smaller calculation amount and a smaller number of random variables than the concatenation
of Toeplitz matrix and the identity matrix, which is a typical example of universal2 hash functions. Therefore, it is better to
evaluate the security under the ε-almost dual universality2 rather than under the universality2. However, the above results in
[12], [36] were given under the universality2. In this paper, we show that the above optimal exponential rate can be attained
by ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions. Indeed, although the previous paper [56] obtained a similar result in the quantum
setting, the exponent in [56] is strictly worse than the optimal exponent even in the commutative case.
B. Evaluation of modified mutual information
When the key generation rate is larger than the conditional entropy date, it is helpful to evaluate how much information is
leaked to the third party. In this case, the L1 distinguishability does not go to zero and does not reflect the amount of leaked
information properly. The mutual information seems to work more properly. Indeed, many papers [50], [52], [7], [6], [53],
[54], [24], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41], [42], [43], [44], [45], [46], [47], [48], [25] employ the mutual information as the security
criterion. In the case of secure random number generation, we need to consider the uniformity as well as the independence.
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2For this purpose, Csisza´r and Narayan [51] modified the mutual information. Then, we call the criterion the modified mutual
information [65], [56]. In the above situation, the amount of leaked information is expected to increase linearly. To reflect
this requirement, it is natural to surpass the chain rule for the criterion. In this paper, we show that only the modified mutual
information satisfies several natural conditions for our security criteria including the chain rule. Since these natural conditions
for our security criteria uniquely determine the security criterion, only the modified mutual information suits the situation
when the key generation rate is larger than the conditional entropy date. Although the previous paper [56] gave a similar
characterization in a quantum setting, the previous characterization [56] could not determine the security criterion uniquely.
When the key generation rate is smaller than the conditional entropy date, the modified mutual information does not go
to zero and increases in proportion to the number n. The linear coefficient reflects the amount of leaked information, and is
called the equivocation rate. The previous paper [65] showed that the optimal equivocation rate can be attained by universal2
hash functions. However, it was not shown whether the optimal equivocation rate can be attained by ε-almost dual universal2
hash functions. In this paper, we show that the above optimal equivocation rate can be attained by ε-almost dual universal2
hash functions.
Further, due to the Pinsker inequality, the modified mutual information goes to zero when the L1 distinguishability criterion
goes to zero. However, the exponential decreasing rate of the L1 distinguishability criterion cannot determine the exponential
decreasing rate of the modified mutual information because the Pinsker inequality is not so tight. The previous paper [13] also
derived an lower bound of the exponentially decreasing rate of the modified mutual information when we apply universal2
hash functions. In this paper, we show that the same lower bound can be attained even when we apply ε-almost dual universal2
hash functions.
C. Smoothing of min entropy vs. smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2
To discuss the asymptotic performance, the paper [16] applies the smoothing of the min entropy. The previous paper [12]
applied the smoothing of Renyi entropy of order 2 when the no leaked information. Since Renyi entropy of order 2 gives a
better evaluation than the min entropy, the smoothing of the min entropy cannot surpass that of Renyi entropy of order 2.
The previous paper [12] also showed that the smoothing of the min entropy cannot realize the optimal exponential decreasing
rate of the L1 distinguishability criterion without any information leakage to the third party. However, the previous paper
[12] did not discuss whether the smoothing of the min entropy can realize the optimal exponential decreasing rate of the L1
distinguishability criterion when a partial information is leaked to the third party. It is needed to clarify whether the smoothing
of the min entropy can realize the optimal exponential decreasing rate of the L1 distinguishability criterion in this situation
because this general situation is more important from the practical viewpoint and many people still believe the importance of
the smoothing of min entropy.
On the other hand, recently, many researchers are interested in second order analysis [18], [20], [22], [21], [19]. Since the
papers [20], [22] for second order analysis employ the method of information spectrum, which has been established by Han
and Ve´rdu in their seminal papers [57], [58], [59], [60], [26] and the book [23], many people are interested in how powerful
the method of information spectrum is. As is explained in Section V, the smoothing of the min entropy is essentially the same
as the method of information spectrum1. Hence, it is important to clarify the limit of the smoothing of the min entropy.
In this paper, we show that the smoothing of the min entropy cannot realize the optimal exponential decreasing rate of
the L1 distinguishability criterion even when a partial information leaked to the third party. Then, we arise another question
when the smoothing of the min entropy can realize the optimal asymptotic performance. To answer this question, we show
that the smoothing of the min entropy can attain the optimal second order key generation rate when the required the L1
distinguishability criterion is fixed although the same result with the fidelity distance was obtained in the previous paper [17].
We also show that the smoothing of the min entropy can attain the optimal equivocation rate. Here, we should explain that
the smoothing of the min entropy is almost same as the method of information spectrum, which is a powerful and general
tool for information theory. Information spectrum has been established by Han and Ve´rdu in their seminal papers [57], [58],
[59], [60], [26] and the book [23]. This method can derive asymptotically tight bounds of the optimal performances of various
information processings.
These obtained results are summarized as Table I.
D. Significance from information theoretical viewpoint
Before describing the organization of this paper, we need to think the current situation of the study of information theoretic
security. Although the information theoretic security has information theoretic formulation, it has been mainly studied by the
community of cryptography not by information theory community. Further, many important papers [16], [27], [63], [65], [56],
[17], [66], [10], [14] in this direction were written with the quantum terminology. Since the information theoretic security even
with the non-quantum setting has a sufficient significance from the practical viewpoint and its formulation has a sufficient
1This argument is true even in the classical case. In the quantum case, there are several variants for information spectrum. Hence, we cannot say that the
smoothing of the min entropy is essentially the same as the method of information spectrum. Indeed, the previous paper [17] discussed this problem only
with fidelity distance.
3TABLE I
SUMMARY OF OBTAINED RESULTS.
setting single-shot/asymptotic L1 MMI
exponent (Re´nyi 2) single-shot
(53) in Theorem 15 (55) in Theorem 15
(77) in Theorem 22 (78) in Theorem 23
asymptotic (86) in Theorem 26 (87) in Theorem 26
exponent (min) single-shot
(66) in Theorem 18 (67) in Theorem 18
(81) in Theorem 24 (82) in Theorem 24
asymptotic (95) in Theorem 28 (96) in Theorem 28
second order (min) single-shot
(66) in Theorem 18 –
(73) in Theorem 20 –
asymptotic (86) in Theorem 25 –
equivocation (min) single-shot
– (101) in Theorem 30
– (106) in Theorem 31
asymptotic – (107) in Theorem 32
L1 is the L1 distinguishability criterion. MMI is the modified mutual information criterion. (min) means the result derived by the smoothing of min entropy.
(Re´nyi 2) means the results derived by the smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2.
similarity to information theory, it should be studied from information theory more actively. Indeed, this paper deals with
a non-quantum topic. So, non-quantum researchers should be contained in the reader of this paper. However, the above
mentioned situation obstructs the non-quantum researchers to access the papers in the information theoretic security even with
the non-quantum setting. To resolve this situation, this paper needs to contain surveys of results originally obtained in quantum
information, which should be written in the non-quantum terminology.
E. Organization
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Now, we give the outline of the preliminary parts. In Section II,
we prepare the information quantities for evaluating the security and derive several useful inequalities for the quantum case.
We also give a clear definition for security criteria. The contents in Section II except for Lemma 7 and Theorem 8 are known.
However, since they are given in quantum terminology, these contents are not familiar for people in information theory. For
readers in information theory, their proofs are given in Appendixes.
In Section III, we introduce several class of hash functions (universal2 hash functions and ε-almost dual universal2 hash
functions). We clarify the relation between ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions and δ-biased ensemble. We also derive an
ε-almost dual universal2 version of two universal hashing lemma based on Lemma for δ-biased ensemble given by Dodis et
al [9]. The latter preliminary parts are more technical and used for proofs of the main results. Although the contents are given
the previous paper [14] with terminologies in quantum information, since they are necessary for the latter discussion, they are
presented in this paper with non-quantum terminologies.
In Section IV, under the ε-almost dual universal2 condition, we evaluate the L1 distinguishability criterion and the modified
mutual information based on the smoothing of min entropy and Re´nyi entropy of order 2. These parts give the definitions for
concepts and quantities describing the main results. These parts are almost included in the papers [14], [56]. So, the larger
part of Sections II III, and IV are surveys with non-quantum terminology.
Next, we outline the main results. In Section V, using the tail probability of a proper event, we evaluate upper bounds
given by the smoothing of min entropy in Section IV with the single-shot setting. This tail probability plays a central role in
information spectrum. The bounds obtained in this section have smaller complexity for calculation than those given in Section
IV. In Section VI, using the information quantities given in Section II, we evaluate upper bounds given in Section IV. The
bounds obtained in this section have smaller complexity for calculation than those given in Sections V and IV. In Section
VII, we derive an exponential decreasing rate for both criteria when we simply apply hash functions. In Section VIII, we also
discuss the case when the key generation rate is greater than the conditional entropy rate.
II. PREPARATION
A. Re´nyi relative entropy
In order to discuss the security problem, we prepare several information quantities for sub-distributions PA QA on a space
A. That is, these are assumed to satisfy the conditions PA(a) ≥ 0 and
∑
a PA(a) ≤ 1. Re´nyi introduced Re´nyi relative entropy
D1+s(PA‖QA) := 1
s
log
∑
a∈A
PA(a)
1+sQA(a)
−s (1)
as a generalization of relative entropy
D(PA‖QA) :=
∑
a∈A
PA(a) log
PA(a)
QA(a)
(2)
4When we apply a stochastic matrix Λ on A, the information processing inequalities
D(Λ(PA)‖Λ(QA)) ≤ D(PA‖QA), D1+s(Λ(PA)‖Λ(QA)) ≤ D1+s(PA‖QA) (3)
hold for s ∈ (0, 1]. Since the map s 7→ sD1+s(PA‖QA) is convex, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: D1+s(PA‖QA) is monotonically increasing for s in (−∞, 0) ∪ (0,∞).
When PA and QA are normalized distributions, we have sD1+s(PA‖QA)|s=0 = 0. Hence, the concavity of s 7→ sD1+s(PA‖QA)
implies lims→0D1+s(PA‖QA) = D(PA‖QA). Then, Lemma 1 yields the following lemma.
Lemma 2: When PA and QA are normalized distributions,
D1−s(PA‖QA) ≤ D(PA‖QA) ≤ D1+s(PA‖QA) (4)
for s > 0 .
B. Conditional Re´nyi entropy
1) Case of joint sub-distribution: Next, we prepare the conditional Re´nyi entropy for a joint sub-distribution PA,E on subsets
A and E . In the following discussion, the sub-distribution PA and PA,E is not necessarily normalized, and is assumed to satisfy
the condition
∑
a PA(a) ≤ 1 or
∑
a,e PA,E(a, e) ≤ 1. For the sub-distributions PA and PA,E , we define the normalized distribu-
tions PA,normal and PA,E,normal by PA,normal(a) := PA(a)/
∑
a PA(a) and PA,E,normal(a, e) := PA,E(a, e)/
∑
a,e PA,E(a, e).
For a sub-distribution PA,E , we define the marginal sub-distribution PA on A by PA(a) :=
∑
e∈E PA,E(a, e). Then, we define
the conditional sub-distribution PA|E on A by PA|E(a|e) := PA,E(a, e)/PE,normal(e). The conditional entropy is given as
H(A|E|PA,E) := H(A,E|PA,E)−H(E|PE,normal).
When we replace PE,normal by another normalized distribution QE on E , we can generalize the above quantities.
H(A|E|PA,E‖QE) := log |A| −D(PA,E‖Pmix,A ×QE)
=−
∑
a,e
PA,E(a, e) log
PA,E(a, e)
QE(e)
=H(A|E|PA,E) +D(PE‖QE)
≥H(A|E|PA,E), (5)
where Pmix,A is the uniform distribution on the set that the random variable A takes values in. By using the Re´nyi relative
entropy, the conditional Re´nyi entropies and the conditional min entropy are given in the way relative to QE as
H1+s(A|E|PA,E‖QE) := log |A| −D1+s(PA,E‖Pmix,A ×QE)
=
−1
s
log
∑
a,e
PA,E(a, e)
1+sQE(e)
−s,
Hmin(A|E|PA,E‖QE) :=− log max
(a,e):QE(e)>0
PA,E(a, e)
QE(e)
. (6)
Applying Lemma 1, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3: The quantity H1+s(A|E|PA,E‖QE) is monotonically decreasing for s in (−∞, 0) ∪ (0,∞).
Since
∑
e PE,normal(e)
∑
a PA|E(a|e)PA,E(a, e)sQE(e)−s ≤ maxa,e:PE(e)>0 PA,E(a, e)sQE(e)−s for s > 0, we have
H1+s(A|E|PA,E‖QE) ≥ Hmin(A|E|PA,E‖QE). (7)
Taking the limit, we obtain the equality
lim
s→+∞
H1+s(A|E|PA,E‖QE) = Hmin(A|E|PA,E‖QE). (8)
Due to (3), when we apply an operation Λ on E , it does not act on the system A. Then,
H(A|E|Λ(PA,E)‖Λ(QE)) ≥ H(A|E|PA,E‖QE) (9)
H1+s(A|E|Λ(PA,E)‖Λ(QE)) ≥ H1+s(A|E|PA,E‖QE). (10)
In particular, the inequalities
H(A|E|Λ(PA,E)) ≥ H(A|E|PA,E)
hold. Conversely, when we apply the function f to the random number a ∈ A, we have
H(f(A)|E|PA,E) ≤ H(A|E|PA,E). (11)
5Now, we introduce two kinds of conditional Re´nyi entropies by specifying QE . The first type is defined by substituting
PE,normal into QE as follows
H↓1+s(A|E|PA,E) :=H1+s(A|E|PA,E‖PE,normal)
=
−1
s
log
∑
e
PE,normal(e)
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s
H↓min(A|E|PA,E) :=Hmin(A|E|PA,E‖PE,normal)
=− log max
(a,e):PE,normal(e)>0
PA|E(a|e)
with s ∈ R \ {0}. Then, as a special case of (10), we have
H↓1+s(A|E|Λ(PA,E)) ≥ H↓1+s(A|E|PA,E) (12)
The second type is defined as
H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E) := max
QE
H1+s(A|E|PA,E‖QE) (13)
This quantity has another expression as follows.
Lemma 4: A joint sub-distribution PA,E satisfies the relation
H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E) = −
1 + s
s
log
∑
e
(
∑
a
PA,E(a, e)
1+s)
1
1+s (14)
for s ∈ [−1,∞)\{0}. The maximum in (13) can be realized when QE(e) = (
∑
a PA,E(a, e)
1+s)1/(1+s)/
∑
e(
∑
a PA,E(a, e)
1+s)1/(1+s).
For reader’s convenience, the proof of Lemma 4 is given in Appendix A. In information theory, we often employ Gallager-type
[8] function [12]:
φ(s|A|E|PA,E) := log
∑
e
(
∑
a
PA,E(a, e)
1/(1−s))1−s
= log
∑
e
PE(e)(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1/(1−s))1−s.
The quantity H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E) can be expressed as
H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E) = −
1 + s
s
φ(
s
1 + s
|A|E|PA,E).
Although H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E) can be lowerly bounded by H↓1+s(A|E|PA,E) due to the definition, we have the opposite
inequality as follows.
Lemma 5: For s ∈ [−1, 1] \ {0}, a joint sub-distribution PA,E satisfies the relation
H↓1+s(A|E|PA,E) ≥ H↑1
1−s
(A|E|PA,E). (15)
The equality holds only when PA|E=e is uniform distribution for all e ∈ E .
Although Lemma 5 can be regarded as a special case of (47) or (48) of [66]2, we give its proof in Appendix B for reader’s
convenience because the proof in [66] given in quantum terminology.
2) Case of joint normalized distribution: When PA,E is a joint normalized distribution, the additional useful properties hold
as follows. In this case, since lims→0 sH↓1+s(A|E|PA,E) = 0, we have
lim
s→0
H↓1+s(A|E|PA,E) = H(A|E|PA,E) (16)
(17)
Hence, we define H↓1 (A|E|PA,E) and H↑1 (A|E|PA,E) to be H(A|E|PA,E). Further, applying Lemma 2, we obtain the following
lemma.
Lemma 6: When PA,E and QE are normalized distributions,
H1−s(A|E|PA,E‖QE) ≥ H(A|E|PA,E‖QE) ≥ H1+s(A|E|PA,E‖QE) (18)
for s > 0.
Similar properties hold for H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E) as follows.
2Historically, the earlier version of this paper showed Lemma 5 at the first time. Then, the paper [66] extended this inequality to the quantum setting.
6Lemma 7:
lim
s→0
H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E) = H(A|E|PA,E). (19)
The map s 7→ sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E) is concave and then the map s 7→ H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E) is monotonically decreasing for
s ∈ (−1,∞). In particular, when PA|E=e is not a uniform distribution for an element e ∈ E , the map s 7→ sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)
is strictly concave and then the map s 7→ H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E) is strictly monotonically decreasing for s ∈ (−1,∞).
Lemma 7 will be shown in Appendix C.
Hence, we define H↑1 (A|E|PA,E) to be H(A|E|PA,E). Then, the relations (19) and (13) hold even with s = 0.
Remark 1: Iwamoto and Shikata [62] discussed conditional Re´nyi entropies in the different notations. They denote H↓1+s(A|E|PA,E)
by RH1+s(A|E) and H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E) by RA1+s(A|E). They also compare these with other conditional Re´nyi entropies. Muller-
Lennert et al [63] denoted H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E) by H↓1+s(PA,E |E) in the quantum setting. Iwamoto and Shikata [62] pointed
out that these quantities do not satisfy the chain rule. Instead, Muller-Lennert et al [63, Proposition 7] showed the inequality
H↑1+s(A|E,E′|PA,E,E′) ≥ H↑1+s(A,E′|E|PA,E,E′)− log |E ′| for s ∈ (−1,∞). Also, the paper [64, Corollary 77] shows the
inequality H1+s(1−s)(A|E|PA,E,E′) ≥ H↓1+s(A,E|PA,E,E′)− log |E| for s ∈ [0, 1).
C. Criteria for secret random numbers
1) Case of joint sub-distribution: Next, we introduce criteria for the amount of the information leaked from the secret
random number A to E for joint sub-distribution PA,E . Using the ℓ1 norm, we can evaluate the secrecy for the state PA,E as
follows:
d1(A|E|PA,E) := ‖PA,E − PA × PE‖1. (20)
Taking into account the randomness, Renner [16] employed the L1 distinguishability criteria for security of the secret random
number A:
d′1(A|E|PA,E) := ‖PA,E − Pmix,A × PE‖1, (21)
which can be regarded as the difference between the true sub-distribution PA,E and the ideal sub-distribution Pmix,A×PE . It
is known that the quantity is universally composable [28].
Renner[16] defined the conditional L2-distance from uniform of PA,E relative to a distribution QE on E :
d2(A|E|PA,E‖QE)
:=
∑
a,e
(PA,E(a, e)− Pmix,A(a)PE(e))2QE(e)−1
=
∑
a,e
PA,E(a, e)
2QE(e)
−1 − 1|A|
∑
e
PE(e)
2QE(e)
−1
=e−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE) − 1|A|e
D2(PA‖QE).
Using this value and a normalized distribution QE , we can evaluate d′1(A|E|PA,E) as follows [16, Lemma 5.2.3]:
d′1(A|E|PA,E) ≤
√
|A|
√
d2(A|E|PA,E‖QE). (22)
2) Case of joint normalized distribution: In the remaining part of this subsection, we assume that PA,E is a normalized
distribution. The correlation between A and E can be evaluated by the mutual information
I(A : E|PA,E) := D(PA,E‖PA × PE). (23)
By using the uniform distribution Pmix,A on A, Csisza´r and Narayan [51] modified the mutual information to
I ′(A|E|PA,E) := D(PA,E‖Pmix,A × PE), (24)
which is called the modified mutual information [56], [65] and satisfies
I ′(A|E|PA,E) = I(A : E|PA,E) +D(PA‖Pmix,A) (25)
and
H(A|E|PA,E) = −I ′(A|E|PA,E) + log |A|. (26)
Indeed, the quantity I(A : E|PA,E) represents the amount of information leaked by E, and the remaining quantityD(PA‖Pmix,A)
describes the difference of the random number A from the uniform random number. So, if the quantity I ′(A|E|PA,E) is small,
we can conclude that the random number A has less correlation with E and is close to the uniform random number.
7Indeed, it is natural to adopt a quantity expressing the difference between the true distribution and the ideal distribution
Pmix,A×PE as a security criterion. However, there are several quantities expressing the difference between two distributions.
Both d′1(A|E|P ) and I ′(A|E|P ) are characterized in this way. Here, we show that the modified mutual criterion I ′(A|E|P )
can be derived in a more natural way in the following sense.
It is natural assume the following condition for the security criterion C(A;E|P ) as well as the the permutation invariance
on A and E .
C1 Chain rule C(A,B|E|P ) = C(B|E|P ) + C(A|B,E|P ).
C2 Linearity When the supports of two marginal distributions PE,1 and PE,2 are disjoint as subsets of E , C(A|E|λP1+
(1 − λ)P2) = λC(A|E|P1) + (1− λ)C(A|E|P2).
C3 Range log |A| ≥ C(A|E|P ) ≥ 0.
C4 Ideal case C(A|E|Pmix,A ⊗ PE) = 0.
C5 Normalization C(A|E||a〉〈a| ⊗ PE) = log |A|.
Unfortunately, the L1 distinguishability does not satisfies C1 Chain rule. However, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 8: C(A|E|P ) satisfies all of the above properties if and only if C(A|E|P ) coincides with the modified mutual
information criterion I ′(A|E|P ) = log |A| −H(A|E|P ).
For a proof, see Appendix D. Hence, it is natural to adopt the modified mutual information criterion I ′(A|E|P ) as a security
criterion. In particular, if one emphasizes C1 Chain rule rather than the universal composability, it is better to employ the
modified mutual information criterion I ′(A|E|P ).
In particular, if the quantity I ′(A|E|PA,E) goes to zero, d′1(A|E|PA,E) also goes to zero as follows. Using Pinsker inequality,
we obtain
d1(A|E|PA,E)2 ≤ 2I(A|E|PA,E) (27)
d′1(A|E|PA,E)2 ≤ 2I ′(A|E|PA,E). (28)
Conversely, we can evaluate I(A : E|PA,E) and I ′(A|E|PA,E) by using d1(A|E|PA,E) and d′1(A|E|PA,E) in the following
way. Applying the Fannes inequality, we obtain
0 ≤I(A : E|PA,E) = H(A|PA) +H(E|PE)−H(A,E|PA,E)
=H(A,E|PA × PE)−H(A,E|PA,E)
=
∑
a
PA(a)H(E|PE)−H(E|PE|A=a)
≤
∑
a
PA(a)η(‖PE|A=a − PE‖1, log |E|)
=η(‖PE,A − PA × PE‖1, log |E|)
=η(d1(A|E|PA,E), log |E|), (29)
where η(x, y) := −x log x+ xy. Similarly, we obtain
0 ≤ I ′(A|E|PA,E)
=H(A|Pmix,A) +H(E|PE)−H(A,E|PA,E)
=H(A,E|Pmix,A × PE)−H(A,E|PA,E)
=
∑
e
PE(e)(H(A|Pmix,A)−H(A|PA|E=e))
≤
∑
e
PE(e)(‖Pmix,A −H(A|PA|E=e)‖1, log |A|)
≤η(‖Pmix,A × PE − PA,E‖1, log |A|)
=η(d′1(A|E|PA,E), log |A|). (30)
III. RANDOM HASH FUNCTIONS
A. General random hash functions
In this section, we focus on a random function fX from A to B, where X is a random variable identifying the func-
tion fX. In this case, the total information of Eve’s system is written as (E,X). Then, by using PfX(A),E,X(b, e, x) :=
8∑
a∈f−1
X
(b) PA,E(a, e)PX(x), the L1 distinguishability criterion is written as
d′1(fX(A)|E,X|PfX(A),E,X)
=‖PfX(A),E,X − Pmix,B × PE,X‖1
=
∑
x
PX(x)‖PfX=x(A),E − Pmix,B × PE‖1
=EX‖PfX(A),E − Pmix,B × PE‖1. (31)
Also, the modified mutual information is written as
I ′(fX(A)|E,X|PfX(A),E,X)
=D(PfX(A),E,X‖Pmix,B × PE,X)
=
∑
x
PX(x)D(PfX=x(A),E,X‖Pmix,B × PE)
=EXD(PfX(A),E,X‖Pmix,B × PE). (32)
We say that a random function fX is ε-almost universal2 [1], [2], [14], if, for any pair of different inputs a1,a2, the collision
probability of their outputs is upper bounded as
Pr [fX(a1) = fX(a2)] ≤ ε|B| . (33)
The parameter ε appearing in (33) is shown to be confined in the region
ε ≥ |A| − |B||A| − 1 , (34)
and in particular, a random function fX with ε = 1 is simply called a universal2 function.
Two important examples of universal2 hash function are the Toeplitz matrices (see, e.g., [3]), and multiplications over a
finite field (see, e.g., [1], [4]). A modified form of the Toeplitz matrices is also shown to be universal2, which is given by a
concatenation (X, I) of the Toeplitz matrix X and the identity matrix I [13]. The (modified) Toeplitz matrices are particularly
useful in practice, because there exists an efficient multiplication algorithm using the fast Fourier transform algorithm with
complexity O(n log n) (see, e.g., [5]).
The following proposition holds for any universal2 function.
Proposition 9 (Renner [16, Lemma 5.4.3]): Given any joint sub-distribution PA,E on A×E and any normalized distribution
QE on E , any universal2 hash function fX from A to M := {1, . . . ,M} satisfies
EXd2(fX(A)|E|PA,E‖QE) ≤ e−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE). (35)
More precisely, the inequality
EXe
−H2(fX(A)|E|PA,E‖QE)
≤(1 − 1
M
)e−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE) +
1
M
eD2(PE‖QE) (36)
holds.
B. Ensemble of linear hash functions
Tsurumaru and Hayashi[14] focus on linear functions over the finite field F2. Now, we treat the case of linear functions over
a finite field Fq, where q is a power of a prime number p. We assume that sets A, B are Fnq , Fmq respectively with n ≥ m, and
f are linear functions over Fq . Note that, in this case, there is a kernel C corresponding to a given linear function f , which is
a vector space of the dimension n−m or more. Conversely, when given a vector subspace C ⊂ Fnq of the dimension n−m
or more, we can always construct a linear function
fC : F
n
q → Fnq /C ∼= Flq, l ≤ m. (37)
That is, we can always identify a linear hash function fC and a code C.
When CX = Ker fX, the definition of ε-universal2 function (33) takes the form
∀x ∈ Fnq \ {0}, Pr [fX(x) = 0] ≤ q−mε, (38)
which is equivalent with
∀x ∈ Fnq \ {0}, Pr [x ∈ CX] ≤ q−mε. (39)
9This shows that the kernel CX contains sufficient information for determining if a random function fX is ε-almost universal2
or not.
For a given random code CX, we define its minimum (respectively, maximum) dimension as tmin := minX dimCX
(respectively, tmax := maxr∈I dimCX). Then, we say that a linear random code CX of minimum (or maximum) dimension t
is an ε-almost universal2 code if the following condition is satisfied
∀x ∈ Fnq \ {0}, Pr [x ∈ CX] ≤ qt−nε. (40)
In particular, if ε = 1, we call CX a universal2 code.
C. Dual universality of a random code
Based on Tsurumaru and Hayashi[14], we define several variations of the universality of a error-correcting random code
and the linear function as follows. First, we define the dual random code C⊥
X
of a given linear random code CX as the dual
code of CX. We also introduce the notion of dual universality as follows. We say that a random code CX in Fnq is ε-almost
dual universal2 with minimum dimension t (with maximum dimension t), if the dual random code C⊥X is ε-almost universal2
with maximum dimension n− t (with minimum dimension n− t). Hence, we say that a linear random function fX from Fnq
to Fmq is ε-almost dual universal2, if the kernels CX of fX forms an ε-almost dual universal2 code with minimum dimension
n −m. This condition is equivalent with the condition that the linear space spanned by the generating matrix of fX forms
an ε-almost universal2 random code with maximum dimension m. An explicit example of a dual universal2 function (with
ε = 1) can be given by the modified Toeplitz matrix mentioned earlier [11], i.e., a concatenation (X, I) of the Toeplitz matrix
X and the identity matrix I . The modified Toeplitz matrix requires n− 1 bits of random seeds R. This example is particularly
useful in practice because it is both universal2 and dual universal2, and also because there exists an efficient algorithm with
complexity O(n logn). When the random variable R is not the uniform random number, the modified Toeplitz matrix is
qn−1e−H
↓
min(R)
-almost dual universal2, as shown in [33]. Therefore, we can evaluate the security of the modified Toeplitz
matrix even with non-uniform random seeds. With these preliminaries, we present the following propositions in [14] with
non-quantum terminologies and a general prime power q:
Proposition 10 ([14, Corollary 2]): An ε-almost universal2 surjective liner random hash function fX from Fnq to Fmq is
q(1− qmε) + (ε− 1)qn−m-almost dual universal2 liner random hash function.
As a special case, we obtain the following.
Corollary 11: Any universal2 linear random function fX over a finite filed Fq is a q-almost dual universal2 function.
Proposition 12 ([14, Lemma 3]): Given a joint sub-distribution PA,E on A × E and a normalized distribution QE on E .
When CX is an ε-almost dual universal2 code with minimum dimension t, the random hash function fCX satisfies
EXd2(fCX(A)|E|PA,E‖QE) ≤ εe−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE). (41)
More precisely,
EXe
−H2(fCX (A)|E|PA,E‖QE)
≤εe−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE) + 1
qn−t
eD2(PE‖QE). (42)
In other words, an ε-almost dual universal2 function fX from Fn2 to Fn−t2 satisfies (41) and (42).
Since Proposition 12 plays an central role instead of Proposition 9 in this paper and the proof in the previous paper [14]
is given with quantum terminologies and the special case q = 2, we give its proof in Appendix E without use of quantum
terminologies for reader’s convenience.
IV. SECURITY BOUNDS WITH RE´NYI ENTROPY OF ORDER 2 AND MIN ENTROPY
Firstly, we consider the secure key generation problem from a common random number A ∈ A which has been partially
eavesdropped as an information by Eve. For this problem, it is assumed that Alice and Bob share a common random number
A ∈ A, and Eve has a random number E correlated with the random number A, whose distribution is PE . The task is to
extract a common random number f(A) from the random number A ∈ A, which is almost independent of Eve’s quantum
state. Here, Alice and Bob are only allowed to apply the same function f to the common random number A ∈ A. Now, we
focus on the random function fX from A to M = {1, . . . ,M}, where X denotes a random variable describing the stochastic
behavior of the function fX.
Renner[16, Lemma 5.2.3] essentially evaluated EXd′1(fX(A)|E|PA,E) by using EXd2(fX(A)|E|PA,E‖QE) as follows.
Lemma 13: When a state QE is a normalized distribution on E , any random hash function fX from A to {1, . . . ,M} satisfies
EXd
′
1(fX(A)|E|PA,E)
≤M 12
√
EXd2(fX(A)|E|PA,E‖QE).
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Further, the inequalities used in proof of Renner[16, Corollary 5.6.1] imply that
EXd
′
1(fX(A)|E|PA,E)
≤2‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1 + EXd′1(fX(A)|E|P ′A,E)
≤2‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1 +M
1
2
√
EXd2(fX(A)|E|P ′A,E‖QE).
Applying the same discussion to Shannon entropy, we can evaluate the average of the modified mutual information criterion
by using EXd2(fX(A)|E|PA,E‖QE) as follows.
Lemma 14: Assume that PA,E is a normalized distribution on A × E . Any random hash function fX from A to M =
{1, . . . ,M} satisfies
EXI
′(fX(A)|E|PA,E)
≤ log(1 +MEXd2(fX(A)|E|PA,E)) (43)
≤MEXd2(fX(A)|E|PA,E‖PE). (44)
Further, when a sub-distribution P ′A,E satisfies P ′E(e) ≤ PE(e) for any e ∈ E (we simplify this condition to P ′E ≤ PE), we
obtain
EXI
′(fX(A)|E|PA,E)
≤η(‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1, logM)
+ log(1 +MEXd2(fX(A)|E|P ′A,E‖PE)) (45)
≤η(‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1, logM)
+MEXd2(fX(A)|E|P ′A,E‖PE), (46)
where η(x, y) := xy − x log x.
Proof: The inequality D2(P ′E‖PE) ≤ 0 holds due to the condition P ′E(e) ≤ PE(e). Since
d2(fX(A)|E|P ′A,E‖PE)
=e−H2(fX(A)|E|P
′
A,E‖PE) − 1
M
eD2(P
′
E‖PE)
≥e−H2(fX(A)|E|P ′A,E‖PE) − 1
M
, (47)
we have
e−H2(fX(A)|E|P
′
A,E‖PE) ≤ d2(fX(A)|E|P ′A,E‖PE) +
1
M
.
Taking the logarithm, we obtain
− logM+ log(1 +Md2(fX(A)|E|P ′A,E‖PE))
≥−H2(fX(A)|E|P ′A,E‖PE) ≥ −H(fX(A)|E|P ′A,E‖PE). (48)
Substituting PA,E to P ′A,E , we obtain H(fX(A)|E|P ′A,E‖PE) = H(fX(A)|E|PA,E) and
I ′(fX(A)|E|PA,E) = logM−H(fX(A)|E|PA,E)
≤ log(1 +Md2(fX(A)|E|PA,E)).
Since the function x 7→ log(1 + x) is concave, we obtain
EXI
′(fX(A)|E|PA,E)
≤ log(1 +MEXd2(fX(A)|E|PA,E)),
which implies (43). The inequality log(1 + x) ≤ x and (43) yield (44).
Due to Fannes inequality, the normalized distribution PA|E=e(a) :=
PA,E(a,e)
PE(e)
and the sub-distribution P ′A|E=e(a) :=
P ′A,E(a,e)
PE(e)
satisfy
|H(fX(A)|PA|E=e)−H(fX(A)|P ′A|E=e)|
≤η(‖PA|E=e − P ′A|E=e‖1, logM). (49)
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Since
∑
e PE(e)‖PA|E=e − P ′A|E=e‖1 = ‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1, taking the average under the distribution PE , we obtain
|H(fX(A)|E|PA,E |PE)−H(fX(A)|E|P ′A,E |PE)|
=|
∑
e
PE(e)(H(fX(A)|PA|E=e)−H(fX(A)|P ′A|E=e))|
≤
∑
e
PE(e)|H(fX(A)|PA|E=e)−H(fX(A)|P ′A|E=e)|
≤
∑
e
PE(e)η(‖PA|E=e − P ′A|E=e‖1, logM)
≤η(
∑
e
PE(e)‖PA|E=e − P ′A|E=e‖1, logM)
=η(‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1, logM). (50)
Therefore, using (50) and (48), we obtain
I ′(fX(A)|E|PA,E)
= logM−H(fX(A)|E|PA,E |PE)
≤η(‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1, logM)
+ logM−H(fX(A)|E|P ′A,E |PE)
≤η(‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1, logM)
+ log(1 +Md2(fX(A)|E|P ′A,E‖PE)).
Taking the expectation of X and using the concavity of functions x 7→ η(x, logM) and x 7→ log(1 + x), we obtain (45). The
inequality log(1 + x) ≤ x yields (46). In this proof, the condition PE(e)′ ≤ PE(e) is crucial because Inequality (47) cannot
be shown without this condition.
Now, we evaluate the security by combining Proposition 12 and Lemmas 13 and 14. For this purpose, we introduce the
quantities:
∆d,2(M, ε|PA,E) := min
QE
min
P ′A,E
2‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1 +
√
εM
1
2 e−
1
2H2(A|E|P ′A,E‖QE)
= min
QE
min
ǫ1>0
2ǫ1 +
√
εM
1
2 e−
1
2H
ǫ1
2 (A|E|PA,E‖QE)
= min
QE
min
R
2 min
P ′A,E :H2(A|E|P ′A,E‖QE)≥R
‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1 +
√
εM
1
2 e−
1
2R,
∆I,2(M, ε|PA,E) := min
P ′A,E :P
′
E≤PE
η(‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1, logM) + εMe−H2(A|E|P
′
A,E‖PE)
= min
ǫ1>0
η(ǫ1, logM) + εMe
−H↓,ǫ12 (A|E|PA,E)
= min
R
η( min
P ′A,E :P
′
E≤PE ,H2(A|E|P ′A,E‖PE)≥R
‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1, logM) + εMe−R,
where
H↓,ǫ12 (A|E|PA,E‖QE) := max
P ′A,E :‖PA,E−P ′A,E‖1≤ǫ1
H2(A|E|P ′A,E‖QE) (51)
Hǫ12 (A|E|PA,E) := max
P ′A,E :‖PA,E−P ′A,E‖1≤ǫ1,P ′E≤PE
H2(A|E|P ′A,E‖PE). (52)
Note that H↓,ǫ12 (A|E|PA,E) is different from Hǫ12 (A|E|PA,E‖PE) because the definition of H↓,ǫ12 (A|E|PA,E) has additional
constraints for P ′A,E . Then, we can evaluate the averages of both security criteria under the ε-almost dual universal2 condition.
Theorem 15: Assume that QE is a normalized distribution on E , PA,E is a sub-distribution on A× E , and a linear random
hash function fX from A to M = {1, . . . ,M} is ε-almost dual universal2. Then, the random hash function fX satisfies
EXd
′
1(fX(A)|E|PA,E)
≤√εM 12 e− 12H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE),
EXd
′
1(fX(A)|E|PA,E)
≤∆d,2(M, ε|PA,E). (53)
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When PA,E is a normalized joint distribution, it satisfies
EXI
′(fX(A)|E|PA,E) ≤ log(1 + εMe−H
↓
2 (A|E|PA,E)) ≤ εMe−H↓2 (A|E|PA,E) (54)
EXI
′(fX(A)|E|PA,E) ≤∆I,2(M, ε|PA,E). (55)
While the same evaluations for the L1 distinguishability criterion under the universal2 condition has been shown in Renner[16,
Corollary 5.6.1], those for the modified mutual information criterion have not been shown even under the universal2 condition.
All of the above evaluations under the ε-almost dual universal2 condition have not been discussed in Renner.
Since the function x 7→ η(x, y) is concave, combing Inequality (30), we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 16: When a linear random hash function fX from A to M = {1, . . . ,M} is ε-almost dual universal2, any joint
sub-distribution PA,E on A and E satisfies
EXI
′(fX(A)|E|PA,E) ≤ η(∆d,2(M, ε|PA,E), log |A|). (56)
for s ∈ (0, 1/2].
Since the function x 7→ √x is concave, combing Inequality (28), we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 17: When a linear random hash function fX from A to M = {1, . . . ,M} is ε-almost dual universal2, any joint
normalized distribution PA,E on A× E satisfy
EXd
′
1(fX(A)|E|PA,E) ≤
√
2∆I,2(M, ε|PA,E) (57)
for s ∈ (0, 1/2].
Further, in the case of the universal2 condition, Renner[16, Corollary 5.6.1] proposed to replace H2(A|E|P ′A,E‖QE) by
the min entropy Hmin(A|E|P ′A,E‖QE) because H2(A|E|P ′A,E‖QE) ≥ Hmin(A|E|P ′A,E‖QE). Based on Hmin(A|E|P‖QE),
Renner[16] introduced ǫ1-smooth min entropy as
Hǫ1min(A|E|PA,E‖QE) := max‖PA,E−P ′A,E‖1≤ǫ1
Hmin(A|E|P ′A,E‖QE). (58)
For the evaluation of EXI ′(fX(A)|E|PA,E), adding the condition P ′E ≤ PE , we define
H↓,ǫ1min (A|E|PA,E) := max‖PA,E−P ′A,E‖1≤ǫ1,P ′E≤PE
Hmin(A|E|P ′A,E‖PE). (59)
As is shown in Lemma 19, H↓,ǫ1min (A|E|PA,E) equals Hǫ1min(A|E|PA,E‖PE) while the former has an additional constraint.
Defining the quantities
∆d,min(M, ε|PA,E) := min
QE
min
P ′A,E
2‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1 +
√
εM
1
2 e−
1
2Hmin(A|E|P ′A,E‖QE) (60)
= min
QE
min
ǫ1>0
2ǫ1 +
√
εM
1
2 e−
1
2H
ǫ1
min(A|E|PA,E‖QE) (61)
= min
QE
min
R
2 min
P ′A,E :Hmin(A|E|P ′A,E‖QE)≥R
‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1 +
√
εM
1
2 e−
1
2R, (62)
∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E) := min
QE
min
P ′A,E :P
′
E≤QE ,
η(‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1, logM) + εMe−Hmin(A|E|P
′
A,E‖PE) (63)
= min
ǫ1>0
η(ǫ1, logM) + εMe
−H↓,ǫ1min (A|E|PA,E) (64)
= min
R
η( min
P ′A,E :P
′
E≤PE ,Hmin(A|E|P ′A,E‖PE)≥R
‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1, logM) + εMe−R, (65)
we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 18: Assume that QE is a normalized distribution on E , PA,E is a sub-distribution on A× E , and a linear random
hash function fX from A to M = {1, . . . ,M} is ε-almost dual universal2. Then, the random hash function fX satisfies
EXd
′
1(fX(A)|E|PA,E) ≤∆d,min(M, ε|PA,E), (66)
EXI
′(fX(A)|E|PA,E) ≤∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E). (67)
That is, ∆d,min(M, ε|PA,E) and ∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E) are upper bounds for leaked information in the respective criteria when
the smoothing of min entropy is applied.
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V. RELATION WITH INFORMATION SPECTRUM
Information spectrum can derive asymptotically tight bounds of the optimal performances of various information processings
by using only the asymptotic behavior of the tail probability, e.g., PA,E{(a, e)|PA|E(a|e) ≥ e−R}. Hence, it can be applied
without any assumption for information sources. While information spectrum originally addresses the asymptotic setting, we
bound the performances in the single-shot setting by using the tail probability. We call these upper and lower bounds single-shot
information spectrum bounds.
In this section, we clarify the relation between the smoothing of min entropy and single-shot information spectrum bounds.
In stead of the smooth min entropy H↓,ǫ1min (A|E|PA,E), we consider the bounds ∆d,min(M, ε|PA,E) and ∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E) as
functions of minP ′A,E :Hmin(A|E|P ′A,E‖QE)≥R ‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1 or minP ′A,E :P ′E≤PE ,Hmin(A|E|P ′A,E‖PE)≥R ‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1. That
is, we employ the formulas (62) and (65) rather than (61) and (64). Then, we give their relations with the tail probability, e.g.,
PA,E{(a, e)|PA|E(a|e) ≥ e−R} as follows.
Lemma 19:
min
P ′A,E :Hmin(A|E|P ′A,E‖QE)≥R
‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1
= min
P ′A,E :Hmin(A|E|P ′A,E‖QE)≥R,P ′A,E≤PA,E
‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1
=PA,E{(a, e)|PA,E(a, e) > e−RQE(e)} − e−R|A|Pmix,A ×QE{(a, e)|PA,E(a, e) > e−RQE(e)}. (68)
and
(1− 1
c
)PA,E{(a, e)|PA,E(a, e) > ce−RQE(e)}
≤PA,E{(a, e)|PA,E(a, e) > e−RQE(e)} − e−R|A|Pmix,A ×QE{(a, e)|PA,E(a, e) > e−RQE(e)}
≤PA,E{(a, e)|PA,E(a, e) > e−RQE(e)} (69)
for c > 1 and R.
Since the condition P ′A,E ≤ PA,E is more restrictive than P ′A ≤ PA, we see that H↓,ǫ1min (A|E|PA,E) = Hǫ1min(A|E|PA,E‖PE).
Proof: The optimal sub-distribution P ′A,E in the first line of (68) is given as
P ′A,E(a, e) =
{
e−RQE(e) if PA,E(a, e) > e−RQE(e)
PA,E(a, e) if PA,E(a, e) ≤ e−RQE(e) (70)
The sub-distribution is the optimal sub-distribution in the second line of (68). Substituting the above sub-distribution in to the
first line, we obtain the third line of (68).
Next, we show (69). Since cPA,E{(a, e)|PA,E(a, e) > ce−RQE(e)} ≥ e−R|A|Pmix,A×QE{(a, e)|PA,E(a, e) > ce−RQE(e)},
we have
(1− 1
c
)PA,E{(a, e)|PA,E(a, e) > ce−RQE(e)}
=PA,E{(a, e)|PA,E(a, e) > ce−RQE(e)} − cPA,E{(a, e)|PA,E(a, e) > ce−RQE(e)}
≤PA,E{(a, e)|PA,E(a, e) > ce−RQE(e)} − e−R|A|Pmix,A ×QE{(a, e)|PA,E(a, e) > ce−RQE(e)}
≤PA,E{(a, e)|PA,E(a, e) > e−RQE(e)} − e−R|A|Pmix,A ×QE{(a, e)|PA,E(a, e) > e−RQE(e)} (71)
≤PA,E{(a, e)|PA,E(a, e) > e−RQE(e)},
where the inequality (71) follows from the fact that the maximum maxΩ PA,E(Ω)− e−R|A|Pmix,A ×QE(Ω) can be realized
by the set {(a, e)|PA,E(a, e) > e−RQE(e)}.
Therefore, using the formulas (62) and (65), we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 20: The upper bounds ∆d,min(M, ε|PA,E) and ∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E) of leaked information by the smoothing of min
entropy can be evaluated as follows.
2(1− 1
c
)min
QE
min
R′
PA,E
{
(a, e)
∣∣∣PA,E(a, e)
QE(e)
> ce−R
′
}
+
√
εM
1
2 e−
1
2R
′ (72)
≤∆d,min(M, ε|PA,E) ≤ min
QE
min
R′
2PA,E
{
(a, e)
∣∣∣PA,E(a, e)
QE(e)
> e−R
′
}
+
√
εM
1
2 e−
1
2R
′
, (73)
(1− 1
c
)min
R′
η(PA,E{(a, e) ∈ A× E|PA|E(a|e) ≥ ce−R
′}, logM) + εMe−R′ (74)
≤∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E) ≤ min
R′
η(PA,E{(a, e) ∈ A× E|PA|E(a|e) > e−R
′}, logM) + εMe−R′ (75)
for c > 1.
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Theorem 20 explains that the bounds ∆d,min(M, ε|PA,E) and ∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E) by the smoothing of min entropy have
almost the same values as the single-shot information spectrum bounds. Using this characterization, we evaluate the bounds
∆d,min(M, ε|PA,E) and ∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E) in the latter sections. However, the bounds by the smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of
order 2 can not be characterized in the same way. This fact seems to indicate the possibility of the smoothing of Re´nyi entropy
of order 2 beyond the smoothing of min entropy.
VI. SECRET KEY GENERATION: SINGLE-SHOT CASE
In order to obtain useful upper bounds, we need to calculate or evaluate the quantities ∆d,2(M, ε|PA,E)1/2, ∆I,2(M, ε|PA,E)1/2,
∆d,max(M, ε|PA,E)1/2, and ∆I,max(M, ε|PA,E)1/2. We say that their exact value is the smoothing bound. Using the smoothing
bound of Re´nyi entropy of order 2, the paper [12] derived the following proposition.
Proposition 21: The inequality
∆d,2(M, 1|PA,E) ≤ 3Mse
−sH↑ 1
1−s
(A|E|PA,E) (76)
holds for s ∈ (0, 1/2].
Using the same smoothing bound, we obtain the following evaluation.
Lemma 22: The inequality
∆d,2(M, ε|PA,E) ≤ (2 +
√
ε)Mse
−sH↑ 1
1−s
(A|E|PA,E) (77)
holds for s ∈ (0, 1/2].
Similar to Theorem 15, we obtain an upper bound for ∆I,2(M, ε|PA,E).
Theorem 23: The inequality
∆I,2(M, ε|PA,E) ≤ η(Mse−sH
↓
1+s(A|E|PA,E), ε+ logM) (78)
holds for s ∈ (0, 1].
Proof: For any integer M, we choose the subset ΩM := {PA|E(a|e) > M−1}, and define the sub-distribution PA,E:M by
PA,E:M(a, e) :=
{
0 if (a, e) ∈ ΩM
PA,E(a, e) otherwise.
For 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, we can evaluate e−H2(A|E|PA,E:M‖PE) and d1(PA,E , PA,E:M) as
e−H2(A|E|PA,E:M‖PE) =
∑
(a,e)∈Ωc
M
PA,E(a, e)
2(PE(e))
−1
≤
∑
(a,e)∈Ωc
M
PA,E(a, e)
1+s(PE(e))
−s
M
−(1−s)
≤
∑
(a,e)
PA,E(a, e)
1+s(PE(e))
−s
M
−(1−s)
=e−sH
↓
1+s(A|E|PA,E)M−(1−s), (79)
‖PA,E − PA,E:M‖1
=PA,E(ΩM) =
∑
(a,e)∈ΩM
PA,E(a, e)
≤
∑
(a,e)∈ΩM
(PA,E(a, e))
1+s
M
s(PE(e))
−s
≤
∑
(a,e)
(PA,E(a, e))
1+s
M
s(PE(e))
−s
=Mse−sH
↓
1+s(A|E|PA,E). (80)
Substituting (79) and (80) into (55), we obtain (57) because
η(Mse−sH
↓
1+s(A|E|PA,E), ε+ logM)
=η(Mse−sH
↓
1+s(A|E|PA,E), logM) + εMse−sH
↓
1+s(A|E|PA,E).
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In the above proof, we choose P ′A,E to be PA,E:M(a, e), we call the smoothing with this particular choice the information-
spectrum-smoothing bound because this type smoothing bound is used to derive the entropic information spectrum in [17].
Indeed, the paper [12] also employed the information-spectrum-smoothing bound to derive Proposition 21.
Further, ∆d,min(M, ε|PA,E) and ∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E) can be evaluated as follows.
Theorem 24: The upper bounds ∆d,min(M, ε|PA,E) and ∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E) of leaked information by the smoothing bound
of min entropy can be evaluated as follows.
∆d,min(M, ε|PA,E) ≤ (2 +
√
ε)min
0≤s
e
−sH
↑
1+s
(A|E|PA,E )+sR
1+2s (81)
∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E) ≤ η(min
0≤s
e
−sH
↓
1+s
(A|E|PA,E )+sR
1+s , ε+ logM). (82)
Theorem 24 gives upper bounds on ∆d,min(M, ε|PA,E) and ∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E). The combination of Theorems 20 and
24 shows the performance of the smoothing bound of min entropy. Using these bounds, we can show the tight exponential
decreasing rates of ∆d,min(M, ε|PA,E) and ∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E).
Proof: Since
PA,E
{
(a, e)
∣∣∣PA,E(a, e)
QE(e)
> e−R
′
}
=
∑
(a,e):
PA,E(a,e)
QE(e)
>e−R′
PA,E(a, e)
≤
∑
(a,e):
PA,E(a,e)
QE(e)
>e−R′
PA,E(a, e)
(PA,E(a, e)
QE(e)
eR
′
)s
≤
∑
(a,e)
PA,E(a, e)
(PA,E(a, e)
QE(e)
eR
′
)s
=e−sH1+s(A|E|PA,E |QE)+sR
′
, (83)
choosing R′ = logM+2sH1+s(A|E|PA,E |QE)1+2s , we have
2PA,E
{
(a, e)
∣∣∣PA,E(a, e)
QE(e)
> e−R
′
}
+
√
εM
1
2 e−
1
2R
′
≤2e−sH1+s(A|E|PA,E |QE)+sR′ +√εM 12 e− 12R′
≤(2 +√ε)e
−(1+s)sH1+s(A|E|PA,E |QE)+sR
1+2s .
Since the above inequality holds for s ≥ 0, Lemma 4 yields that
min
QE
min
R′
2PA,E
{
(a, e)
∣∣∣PA,E(a, e)
QE(e)
> e−R
′
}
+
√
εM
1
2 e−
1
2R
′
≤min
0≤s
min
QE
(2 +
√
ε)e
−(1+s)sH1+s(A|E|PA,E |QE)+sR
1+2s
=(2 +
√
ε)min
0≤s
e
−sH
↑
1+s
(A|E|PA,E )+sR
1+2s
Hence, combining (73), we obtain (81).
Choosing R′ = logM+sH
↓
1+s(A|E|PA,E)
1+s , we have
η(PA,E
{
(a, e)
∣∣∣PA|E(a|e) > e−R′
}
, logM) + εMe−R
′
≤η(e−sH↓1+s(A|E|PA,E)+sR′ , logM) + εMe−R′
≤η(e
−sH
↓
1+s
(A|E|PA,E )+sR
1+s , logM) + εe
−sH
↓
1+s
(A|E|PA,E )+sR
1+s
=η(e
−sH
↓
1+s
(A|E|PA,E )+sR
1+s , ε+ logM).
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Since the above inequality holds for s ≥ 0, we have
min
R′
η(PA,E
{
(a, e)
∣∣∣PA|E(a|e) > e−R′
}
, logM) + εMe−R
′
≤min
0≤s
η(e
−sH
↓
1+s
(A|E|PA,E )+sR
1+s , ε+ logM)
=η(min
0≤s
e
−sH
↓
1+s
(A|E|PA,E )+sR
1+s , ε+ logM),
Hence, combining (75), we obtain (82).
Remark 2: Here, we compare the calculation amount of obtained bounds in Sections IV, V, and VI. In order to calculate
the bounds ∆d,2(M, ε|PA,E), ∆I,2(M, ε|PA,E), ∆d,min(M, ε|PA,E), and ∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E) based on the smoothing, we need
calculate the smooth entropies, which contains several optimizations. Hence, the calculation of these bounds requires at least
double optimization process. Then, they need higher calculation amounts. In particular, if the block size becomes larger, their
calculation amounts increase heavily.
The bounds given in Section V are calculated from the tail probability. For example, the tail probability PA,E{(a, e)|PA|E(a|e) >
e−R
′} can be characterized as the tail probability with respect to the random variable logPA|E(a|e) because PA,E{(a, e)|PA|E(a|e) >
e−R
′} = PA,E{(a, e)| logPA|E(a|e) > −R′}. Hence, in the i.i.d. case, this probability can be calculated by using statistical
packages. While the calculation amount increases with a rise in the block size, it is not as large as the above cases because
statistical packages can be used.
The calculation amounts of the bounds given in Section VI are quite small. In particular, in the i.i.d. case, the calculation
amounts do not depend on the block size. These bounds have great advantages with respect to their calculation amounts.
VII. SECRET KEY GENERATION: ASYMPTOTIC CASE
Next, we consider the case when the information source is given by the n-fold independent and identical distribution PnA,E
of PA,E , i.e., PAn,En = PnA,E . In this case, Ahlswede and Csisza´r [7] showed that the optimal generation rate
G(PAE) := sup
{(fn,Mn)}
{
lim
n→∞
logMn
n
∣∣∣∣ d′1(fn(An)|En|PnA,E) → 0
}
equals the conditional entropy H(A|E), where fn is a function from An to {1, . . . ,Mn}. That is, when the generation rate
R = limn→∞ logMnn is smaller than H(A|E), the quantity d′1(fn(An)|En|PnA,E) goes to zero. In order to treat the speed of
this convergence, we focus on the supremum of the exponential rate of decrease (exponent) for d′1(fn(An)|En|PnA,E) and
I ′(fn(An)|En|PnA,E) = I(fn(An) : En|PnA,E) +D(Pfn(An)‖Pmix,fn(An)) for a given R.
Due to (30), when d′1(fCn(An)|En|PnA,E) goes to zero, I ′(fCn(An)|En|PnA,E) goes to zero. Conversely, due to (28), when
I ′(fCn(An)|En|PnA,E) goes to zero, d′1(fCn(An)|En|PnA,E) goes to zero. So, even if we replace the security criterion by
I ′(fCn(An)|En|PnA,E), the optimal generation rate does not change.
Now, we consider the case when the length of generated keys behaves as nH(A|E|P )+√nR. It is known in [29, Subsection
II-D] that
lim
n→∞minf
d′1(f(An)|En|PnA,E) = 2
∫ R/√V (P )
−∞
1√
2π
e−x
2/2dx. (84)
Then, using Theorem 24, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 25: We choose a polynomial P (n). When a random linear function fXn from An to {1, . . . , ⌊enH(A|E|P )+
√
nR⌋}
is P (n)-almost dual universal2, the relations
lim
n→∞
EXnd
′
1(fXn(An)|En|PnA,E) = limn→∞minf d
′
1(f(An)|En|PnA,E) = 2
∫ R/√V (P )
−∞
1√
2π
e−x
2/2dx (85)
hold, where we take the minimum under the condition that f is a function from An to {1, . . . , ⌊enH(A|E|P )+
√
nR⌋} and
V (P ) :=
∑
a,e PA,E(a, e)(logPA|E(a|e)−H(A|E|P ))2.
Lemma 25 implies that any P (n)-almost dual universal2 hash function realizes the optimality in the sense of the second
order asymptotics when we employ the L1 distinguishability criterion. This analysis is obtained from the smoothing bound
of min entropy. That is, this analysis does not require the smoothing bound of Re´nyi entropy of order 2. The second order
analysis with the mutual information criterion is not so easy. This topic will be discussed in a future paper.
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Proof: We applying (73) in Theorem 20 with R′ = nH(A|E|P )+√nR+n1/4. Then, the central limit theorem guarantees
that
EXnd
′
1(fXn(An)|En|PnA,E) ≤ ∆d,min(enH(A|E|P )+
√
nR+n1/4 , P (n)|PnA,E)
≤2PnA,E{(a, e)|PnA|E(a|e) > e−nH(A|E|P )−
√
nR−n1/4}+
√
P (n)e−n
1/4/2
→2
∫ R/√V (P )
−∞
1√
2π
e−x
2/2dx.
Since minf d′1(f(An)|En|PnA,E) ≤ d′1(fXn(An)|En|PnA,E), combining (84), we obtain (85).
Now, we proceed to the exponential decreasing rate when we choose the key generation rate R is greater than H(A|E|P ).
Since the discussion for the exponential decreasing rate is more complex, more delicate treatment is required. First, we should
remark that the exponential decreasing rate depends on the choice of the security criterion. Then, we obtain the following
theorem.
Theorem 26: We choose a polynomial P (n). When a linear random function fXn from An to {1, . . . , ⌊enR⌋} is P (n)-almost
dual universal2, the relations
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EXnd
′
1(fXn(An)|En|PnA,E) ≥ lim infn→∞
−1
n
log∆d,2(e
nR, P (n)|PnA,E) ≥ ed(PA,E |R) (86)
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EXnI
′(fXn(An)|En|PnA,E) ≥ lim infn→∞
−1
n
log∆I,2(e
nR, P (n)|PnA,E) ≥ eI(PA,E |R) (87)
hold, where
ed(PA,E |R) := max
0≤t≤ 12
t(H↑1
1−t
(A|E|PA,E)−R) (88)
eI(PA,E |R) := max
0≤s≤1
s(H↓1+s(A|E|PA,E)−R). (89)
Proof: (86) can be shown by Theorem 22. (87) can be shown by Theorem 23.
As is shown in Appendix F-A, the following relation between two exponents eI(PA,E |R) and ed(PA,E |R) holds.
Lemma 27: we obtain
1
2
eI(PA,E |R) ≤ed(PA,E |R) (90)
eI(PA,E |R) ≥ed(PA,E |R). (91)
First, we consider the tightness of Inequality (86). Corollary 17 yields the exponent eI (PA,E |R)2 for the L1 distinguishability
criterion. Lemma 27 shows that the exponents by Theorem 22 is better than that by Corollary 17. Further, it is also shown in
[36, Theorem 30] that there exists a sequence of universal2 functions fXn from An to {1, . . . , ⌊enR⌋} such that
lim sup
n→∞
−1
n
log EXnd
′
1(fXn(An)|En|PnA,E) ≤ e¯d(PA,E |R), (92)
where
e¯d(PA,E |R) := max
0≤t
t(H↑1
1−t
(A|E|PA,E)−R). (93)
When the maximum max0≤t t(H↑1
1−t
(A|E|PA,E)−R) is attained with t ∈ (0, 12 ], we have ed(PA,E |R) = e¯d(PA,E |R). Assume
that P (n) ≥ 1. Then, Since ∆d,2(enR, 1) ≤ ∆d,2(enR, P (n)|PnA,E) ≤
√
P (n)∆d,2(e
nR, 1|PnA,E), combining (76), (86), and
(92) we have
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log∆d,2(e
nR, P (n)|PnA,E) = limn→∞
−1
n
log∆d,2(e
nR, 1|PnA,E) = ed(PA,E |R). (94)
That is, our evaluation (86) for ∆d,2(enR, P (n)|PnA,E) is sufficiently tight in the large deviation sense.
Next, we consider the tightness of Inequality (87). Corollary 16 yields the exponent ed(PA,E |R) for the modified mutual
information criterion. Lemma 27 shows that the exponent by Theorem 23 is better than that by Corollary 16. Further, the lower
bound of the exponent ed(PA,E |R) is the same as that given in the previous paper [13] under the universal2 condition. Since
the bound given in [13] is the best lower bound of the exponent, our evaluation (87) for ∆I,2(enR, P (n)|PnA,E) is as good as
the existing evaluation [13] in the large deviation sense.
From the above discussion, we find that the exponents directly obtained by the smoothing bound of Re´nyi entropy of order
2 are better than the exponents derived from the combination of Inequality (28)/(30) and the exponent of the other criterion.
This fact indicates that we need to choose the smoothing bound dependently of the security criterion.
Remark 3: Now, we consider the relation with the recent paper [27] discussing the quantum case as including the non-
quantum case. When A = Fq, we focus on a 1+P (n)q−n+⌊nR⌋-almost universal2 surjective linear function fXn over the field
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Fq from Fnq to F
⌊nR⌋
q . Thanks to Proposition 10, the surjective linear random function fXn over the field Fq is q+P (n)-almost
dual universal2. Hence, we obtain (86), which can recover a part of the result by [27] with the case of linear functions in the
non-quantum case. The paper [27] showed the security with an ǫn-almost universal2 hash function when ǫn approaches to 1.
Since we assume the surjectivity, our method cannot recover the result by [27] with the linear hash function perfectly.
Now, we clarify how better our smoothing bound of Re´nyi entropy of order 2 is than the smoothing bound of min entropy.
As is shown in Appendix G, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 28: The relations
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log∆d,min(e
nR, ε|PnA,E)
=e˜d(PA,E |R) := max
0≤s
s(H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)−R)
1 + 2s
(95)
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log∆I,min(e
nR, ε|PnA,E)
=e˜I(PA,E |R) := max
0≤s
sH↓1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR
1 + s
(96)
hold.
For the comparison of the exponents by the smoothing bound of min entropy and Re´nyi entropy of order 2, as is shown in
Appendix F-B, we have the following lemma by using Theorem 24.
Lemma 29: The inequalities
ed(PA,E |R) >e˜d(PA,E |R) (97)
eI(PA,E |R) >e˜I(PA,E |R) (98)
hold when PA|E=e is not a uniform distribution for an element e ∈ E . The equalities ed(PA,E |R) = e˜d(PA,E |R) and
eI(PA,E |R) = e˜I(PA,E |R) hold when PA|E=e is a uniform distribution for any element e ∈ E .
Theorem 28 and Lemma 29 show that the smoothing bound of min entropy cannot attain the exponents ed(PA,E |R) and
eI(PA,E |R). That is, the bounds ∆d,2(enR, ε|PnA,E) and ∆I,2(enR, ε|PnA,E) by the smoothing bound of Re´nyi entropy of order
2 are strictly better than the bounds ∆d,min(enR, ε|PnA,E) and ∆I,min(enR, ε|PnA,E) by the smoothing bound of min entropy
in the sense of large deviation. This fact indicates the importance of smoothing bound of Re´nyi entropy of order 2.
In summary, while the smoothing bound of min entropy yields the tight bound in the sense of the second order asymptotics,
the smoothing bound of min entropy cannot yield the tight bound in the sense of the exponential decreasing rate.
Remark 4: Here, we give the relation with the results in the quantum case [56]. The paper [56] showed that
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log∆d,2(e
nR, P (n)|PnA,E) ≥ max
0≤t≤ 12
t
2(1− t) (H
↑
1
1−t
(A|E|PA,E)−R) (99)
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log∆I,2(e
nR, P (n)|PnA,E) ≥ max
0≤s≤1
s
2− s (H
↓
1+s(A|E|PA,E)−R). (100)
The RHSs of (99) and (100) are smaller than ed(PA,E |R) and eI(PA,E |R), respectively. Hence, our result is better in the
non-quantum case.
VIII. EQUIVOCATION RATE OF SECRET KEY GENERATION
When the key generation rate R is larger than the conditional entropy H(A|E|PA,E), the leaked information does not go to
zero. In this case, it is natural to consider the rate of the conditional entropy rate of generated keys or the rate of the modified
mutual information [30]. The former rate is called the equivocation rate, and is known to be less than the conditional entropy
H(A|E|PA,E) [30]. That is, the rate of the modified mutual information is larger than R − H(A|E|PA,E). Now, we show
that the minimum rate of the modified mutual information R−H(A|E|PA,E) can be achieved by an ε-almost dual universal2
hash function. For this purpose, we employ (45) instead of (46). Then, we obtain a slightly stronger evaluation than Theorem
18.
Theorem 30: Assume that QE is a normalized distribution on E , PA,E is a sub-distribution on A× E , and a linear random
hash function fX from A to M = {1, . . . ,M} is ε-almost dual universal2. Then, the random hash function fX satisfies
EXI
′(fX(A)|E|PA,E) ≤ ∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E), (101)
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where
∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E) := min
QE
min
P ′A,E :P
′
E≤QE ,
η(‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1, logM) + log(1 + εMe−Hmin(A|E|P
′
A,E‖PE)) (102)
= min
ǫ1>0
η(ǫ1, logM) + log(1 + εMe
−H↓,ǫ1min (A|E|PA,E)) (103)
= min
R′
η( min
P ′A,E :P
′
E≤PE ,Hmin(A|E|P ′A,E‖PE)≥R
‖PA,E − P ′A,E‖1, logM) + log(1 + εMe−R
′
). (104)
Further, by using similar discussions as Sections V and VI, the upper bound ∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E|PA,E) can be evaluated as
follows.
Theorem 31:
∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E|PA,E) ≤min
R′
η(PA,E{(a, e)|PA|E(a|e) > e−R
′}, logM) + log(1 + εMe−R′) (105)
≤min
R′
η(min
s≥0
es(R
′−H↓1+s(A|E|PA,E), logM) + log(1 + εMe−R
′
) (106)
Proof: Inequality (105) follows from Lemma 19 and (104). Inequality (106) follows from (83) with QE = PE .
Now, we consider the asymptotic behavior of ∆I,min(⌈enR⌉, ε|PnA,E).
Theorem 32: Any polynomial P (n) satisfies
lim
n→∞
1
n
∆I,min(⌈enR⌉, P (n)|PnA,E) = R−H(A|E|PA,E) (107)
for R ≥ H(A|E|PA,E).
Theorem 32 shows that ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions realize the asymptotically optimal performance in the sense
of equivocation rate. Further, Theorem 32 clarifies that the smoothing bound of min entropy yields the optimal evaluation in
the sense of equivocation rate.
Proof: It is known by [30] that any sequence of hash function from A to {1, . . . , ⌈enR⌉} satisfies
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
EX,nI
′(fX,n(A)|E|PA,E) ≥ R−H(A|E|PA,E). (108)
Hence, it is enough to show that
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
∆I,min(⌈enR⌉, P (n)|PnA,E) ≤ R−H(A|E|PA,E). (109)
We choose R′ < H(A|E|PA,E). Relation (106) implies that
1
n
∆I,min(⌈enR⌉, P (n)|PnA,E) ≤
1
n
η(min
s≥0
esn(R
′−H↓1+s(A|E|PA,E), nR) +
1
n
log(1 + P (n)en(R−R
′)) (110)
Since R′ < H(A|E|PA,E), the value mins≥0 esn(R
′−H↓1+s(A|E|PA,E) goes to zero exponentially. Hence, the term
1
nη(mins≥0 e
sn(R′−H↓1+s(A|E|PA,E), nR) goes to zero. Since 1n log(1+P (n)e
n(R−R′)) ≤ R−R′+ 1n log(1+P (n)) → R−R′,
we have
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
∆I,min(⌈enR⌉, P (n)|PnA,E) ≤ R −R′. (111)
Since R′ is an arbitrary real number satisfying R′ < H(A|E|PA,E), we obtain (109).
IX. CONCLUSION
We have derived upper bounds for the leaked information in the modified mutual information criterion and the L1 distin-
guishability criterion when we apply an ε-almost dual universal2 hash function for privacy amplification. (Theorems 23 and
22 in Section VI). Then, we have derived lower bounds on their exponential decreasing rates in the i.i.d. setting. (Theorem 26
in Section VII).
We have rigorously compared the exponents by the smoothing bound of min-entropy and Re´nyi entropy of order 2. That is,
we have clarified the upper bounds of leaked information via the smoothing of min-entropy in the both criteria. That is, we
have compared ∆d,2(M, ε|PA,E) and ∆d,min(M, ε|PA,E) for Re´nyi entropy of order 2, and have done ∆I,2(M, ε|PA,E) and
∆I,min(M, ε|PA,E) for modified mutual information criterion. We have derived the exponents of the upper bounds (Theorem
28 in Section VI), and have shown that the exponents are strictly worse than the exponents by the smoothing bound of Re´nyi
entropy of order 2 (Lemma 29 in Section VI). This fact shows the importance of the smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2.
The obtained exponents are summarized in Table II.
Due to Pinsker inequality and Inequality (30), the exponential convergence of one criterion yields the exponential convergence
of the other criterion. However, we have shown that better exponential decreasing rates can be obtained by separate derivations.
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For example, the smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2 yields the exponent ed(PA,E |R) for the L1 distinguishability criterion,
which yields the exponent ed(PA,E |R) for the modified mutual information criterion by using Pinsker inequality. Similarly, the
smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2 yields the exponent eI(PA,E |R) for the modified mutual information criterion, which
yields the exponent eI (PA,E |R)2 for the L1 distinguishability criterion by Inequality (30). Since ed(PA,E |R) ≥
eI(PA,E |R)
2 and
eI(PA,E |R) ≥ ed(PA,E |R), the exponents directly derived by the smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2 are better than the
exponents derived from the combination of the exponent for the other criterion and the inequality.
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF OBTAINED LOWER BOUNDS ON EXPONENTS.
Method L1 MMI
smooth Re´nyi 2 ed(PA,E |R) eI(PA,E |R)
smooth min e˜d(PA,E |R) e˜I(PA,E |R)
smooth Re´nyi 2 is the exponent for privacy amplification via the smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2. smooth min is the exponent for privacy amplification
via the smoothing of min entropy. L2 is the L1 distinguishability criterion. MMI is the modified mutual information criterion.
We have also shown that the application of ε-almost dual universal hash function attains the asymptotically optimal
performance in the sense of the second order asymptotics as well as in that of the asymptotic equivocation rate. These
facts have been shown by using the smoothing of min entropy. We can conclude that ε-almost dual universal hash functions
are very a useful class of hash functions. Further, these discussions show that the smoothing of min entropy is sufficiently
powerful except for the exponential decreasing rate. That is, the exponential decreasing rate requires more delicate evaluation
than other settings.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
For two non-negative functions X(e) and Y (e), the reverse Ho¨lder inequality [34]∑
e
X(e)Y (e) ≥ (
∑
e
X(e)1/(1+s))1+s(
∑
e
Y (e)−1/s)−s
holds for s ∈ (0,∞]. Substituting ∑a PA,E(a, e)1+s and QE(e)−s to X(e) and Y (e), we obtain
e−sH1+s(A|E|PA,E‖QE)
=
∑
e
∑
a
PA,E(a, e)
1+sQE(e)
−s
≥(
∑
e
(
∑
a
PA,E(a, e)
1+s)1/(1+s))1+s(
∑
e
QE(e)
−s·−1/s)−s
=(
∑
e
(
∑
a
PA,E(a, e)
1+s)1/(1+s))1+s
=(
∑
e
(
∑
a
PA,E(a, e)
1+s)
1
1+s )1+s
for s ∈ (0,∞]. Since the equality holds when QE(e) = (
∑
a PA,E(a, e)
1+s)1/(1+s)/
∑
e(
∑
a PA,E(a, e)
1+s)1/(1+s), we obtain
e−sH
↑
1+s(A|E|PA,E),= min
QE
e−sH1+s(A|E|PA,E‖QE) = (
∑
e
(
∑
a
PA,E(a, e)
1+s)
1
1+s )1+s
which implies (13) with s ∈ (0,∞].
For two non-negative functions X(e) and Y (e), the Ho¨lder inequality∑
e
X(e)Y (e) ≤ (
∑
e
X(e)1/(1+s))1+s(
∑
e
Y (e)−1/s)−s
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holds for s ∈ [−1, 0). The same substitution yields
e−sH1+s(A|E|PA,E‖QE) ≤ (
∑
e
(
∑
a
PA,E(a, e)
1+s)
1
1+s )1+s
for s ∈ [−1, 0). Hence, similarly we obtain (13) with s ∈ [−1, 0).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
For s ∈ (0, 1] and two functions X(a) and Y (a), the Ho¨lder inequality∑
a
X(a)Y (a) ≤ (
∑
a
|X(a)|1/(1−s))1−s(
∑
a
|Y (a)|1/s)s
holds. The equality holds only when X(a) is a constant times of Y (a). Substituting PA,E(a, e) and (PA,E(a,e)PE(e) )
s to X(a) and
Y (a), we obtain
e−sH
↓
1+s(A|E|PA,E)
=
∑
e
∑
a
PA,E(a, e)(
PA,E(a, e)
PE(e)
)s
≤
∑
e
(
∑
a
PA,E(a, e)
1/(1−s))1−s(
∑
a
PA,E(a, e)
PE,normal(e)
)s
=
∑
e
(
∑
a
PA,E(a, e)
1/(1−s))1−s
=e
−sH↑ 1
1−s
(A|E|PA,E)
for s ∈ (0, 1] because ∑a PA,E(a,e)PE,normal(e) = PE(e)PE,normal(e) ≤ 1. The equality condition holds only when PA|E=e is uniform
distribution for all e ∈ E .
For s ∈ [−1, 0) and two functions X(a) and Y (a), the reverse Ho¨lder inequality [34]∑
a
X(a)Y (a) ≥ (
∑
a
|X(a)|1/(1−s))1−s(
∑
a
|Y (a)|1/s)s
holds. The same substitution yields
e−sH
↓
1+s(A|E|PA,E) ≥ e
−sH↑ 1
1−s
(A|E|PA,E)
for s ∈ [−1, 0) because (∑a PA,E(a,e)PE,normal(e) )s = ( PE(e)PE,normal(e) )s ≥ 1. The equality condition holds only when PA|E=e is uniform
distribution for all e ∈ E .
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
First, we show (19). Taking the limit s→ 0, we obtain
H(A|E|PA,E) = −dφ(s|A|E|PA,E)
ds
|s=0
=− lim
s→0
φ(s|A|E|PA,E)
s
= lim
s→0
H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E). (112)
The remaining properties are shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 33:
− d
ds
sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)
=
∑
a,e
PA,E;s(a, e)
(
logPA|E(a|e)−
1
1 + s
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
)
+ φ(
s
1 + s
|A|E|PA,E), (113)
− d
2
ds2
sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)
=(1 + s)
∑
a,e
PA,E;s(a, e)
( 1
1 + s
logPA|E(a|e)−
1
(1 + s)2
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
)2
− (1 + s)
(∑
a,e
PA,E;s(a, e)
( 1
1 + s
logPA|E(a|e)−
1
(1 + s)2
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
))2
. (114)
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Hence, when we regard H↑1 (A|E|PA,E) as H(A|E|PA,E) and PA|E=e is not a uniform distribution for an element e ∈ E ,
the function s 7→ −sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E) is strictly convex in (−1,∞). That is, the map s 7→ sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E) is strictly
concave and then the map s 7→ H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E) is strictly monotonically decreasing for s ∈ (−1,∞).
Proof: We define
ϕ(s) :=
∑
e
PE(e)(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
1
1+s .
Then,
dϕ(s)
ds
=
∑
a,e
PA|E(a|e)1+sPE(e)
(
∑
a PA|E(a|e)1+s)
s
1+s (
∑
e PE(e)
( 1
1 + s
logPA|E(a|e)−
1
(1 + s)2
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
)
=ϕ(s)
∑
a,e
PA,E;s(a, e)
( 1
1 + s
logPA|E(a|e)−
1
(1 + s)2
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
)
.
Since
− d
ds
sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)
=φ(
s
1 + s
|A|E|PA,E) + (1 + s)dϕ(s)
ds
ϕ(s)−1,
we obtain (113).
Next, we show (114). Since
d2ϕ(s)
ds2
=
∑
a,e
PA|E(a|e)1+sPE(e)
(
∑
a PA|E(a|e)1+s)
s
1+s (
∑
e PE(e)
( 1
1 + s
logPA|E(a|e)−
1
(1 + s)2
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
)2
+
∑
a,e
PA|E(a|e)1+sPE(e)
(
∑
a PA|E(a|e)1+s)
s
1+s (
∑
e PE(e)
(
− 2
(1 + s)2
logPA|E(a|e) +
2
(1 + s)3
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
)
=ϕ(s)
∑
a,e
PA,E;s(a, e)
( 1
1 + s
logPA|E(a|e)−
1
(1 + s)2
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
)2
− 2
(1 + s)
dϕ(s)
ds
,
we have
d2
ds2
(1 + s)φ(
s
1 + s
|A|E|PA,E)
=(1 + s)
d2
ds2
φ(
s
1 + s
|A|E|PA,E) + 2 d
ds
φ(
s
1 + s
|A|E|PA,E)
=(1 + s)
ϕ(s)d
2ϕ(s)
ds2 − dϕ(s)ds
2
ϕ(s)2
+ 2
dϕ(s)
ds
ϕ(s)
=(1 + s)
ϕ(s)d
2ϕ(s)
ds2 − dϕ(s)ds
2
ϕ(s)2
+ 2
dϕ(s)
ds
ϕ(s)
=(1 + s)
∑
a,e
PA,E;s(a, e)
( 1
1 + s
logPA|E(a|e)−
1
(1 + s)2
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
)2
− (1 + s)
(∑
a,e
PA,E;s(a, e)
( 1
1 + s
logPA|E(a|e)−
1
(1 + s)2
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
))2
,
which implies (114).
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 8
First, we show that the modified mutual information criterion I ′(A|E|P ) = log |A| −H(A|E|P ) satisfies all of the above
conditions. We can trivially check the conditions C4 Ideal case and C5 Normalization. We show other conditions. C1 Chain
rule can be shown as follows.
I ′(A,B|E|P ) = log |A|+ log |B| −H(A,B,E|P ) +H(E|P )
= log |A|+ log |B| −H(B,E|P ) +H(E|P )−H(A,B,E|P ) +H(B,E|P )
= log |A|+ log |B| −H(B|E|P )−H(A|B,E|P ) = I ′(A|B,E|P ) + I ′(B|E|P ).
When two marginal distributions PE,1 and PE,2 are distinghuishable on E ,
I ′(A|E|λP1 + (1− λ)P2) = log |A| −H(A,E|λP1 + (1 − λ)P2) +H(E|λP1 + (1 − λ)P2)
= log |A| − λH(A,E|P1)− (1− λ)H(A,E|P2)− h(λ) + λH(E|P1) + (1 − λ)H(E|P2) + h(λ)
= log |A| − λH(A,E|P1)− (1− λ)H(A,E|P2) + λH(E|P1) + (1− λ)H(E|P2)
=λI ′(A|E|P1) + (1− λ)I ′(A|E|P2),
which implies C2 Linearity. I ′(A|E|P ) = D(P‖Pmix,A ⊗ PE) ≥ 0. Since H(A,E|P ) ≥ 0, I ′(A|E|P ) satisfies C3 Range.
Thus, I ′(A|E|P ) satisfies all of the above properties.
Next, we show that an quantity satisfying all of the above properties is the modified mutual information criterion I ′(A|E|P ) =
log |A| −H(A|E|P ). For this purpose, we focus on H˜(A|E|P ) := log |A| − C(A|E|P ). Due to C1 Linearity, we have
H˜(A|E|P ) =
∑
e
PE(e)H˜(A|E|PA|E=e).
Further, we see that the quantity H˜(A|E|PA|E=e) satisfies Khinchin’s axioms [55] for entropy because of the remaining prop-
erties. Hence, we find that H˜(A|E|PA|E=e) = H(PA|E=e). Thus, H˜(A|E|P ) is equal to the conditional entropy H(A|E|P ).
Hence, C(A|E|P ) = I ′(A|E|P ).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 12
Since the proof of Proposition 12 is related to δ-biased ensemble, we make several preparations before starting the proof of
Proposition 12. According to Dodis and Smith[9], we introduce δ-biased ensemble of random variables WX on a vector space
over a general finite field Fq, where q is the power of the prime p. First, we fix a non-degenerate bilinear form ( , ) from
F
2
q to Fp. Then, we define (x · y) ∈ Fp for x, y ∈ Fnq as (x · y) :=
∑n
j=1 xj · yj . For a given δ > 0, an ensemble of random
variables {WX} on Fnq is called δ-biased when the inequality
EX|EWXω(x·WX)p |2 ≤ δ2 (115)
holds for any x 6= 0 ∈ Fnq , where ωp := e
2πi
p
.
We denote the random variable subject to the uniform distribution on a code C ∈ Fnq , by WC . Then,
EWCω
(x·WC)
p =
{
0 if x /∈ C⊥
1 if x ∈ C⊥. (116)
Using the above relation, as is suggested in [9, Case 2], we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 34: When a random code CX in Fnq is ε-almost dual universal with minimum dimension t, the ensemble of random
variables WCX in Fnq is
√
εq−t-biased.
Proof: C⊥
X
is ε-almost universal with maximum dimension n−t in Fnq . Hence, for any x ∈ Fnq , the probability Pr{x ∈ C⊥X}
is less than εq−t. Thus, (116) guarantees that the ensemble of random variables WCX in Fnq is
√
εq−t-biased.
In the following, we treat the case of A = Fnq . Given a joint sub-distribution PA,E on A× E and a normalized distribution
PW on A, we define another joint sub-distribution PA,E ∗ PW (a, e) := ∑w PW (w)PA,E(a − w, e). Using these concepts,
Dodis and Smith[9] evaluated the average of d2(A|E|PA,E ∗ PWX‖QE) as follows.
Proposition 35 ([9, Lemma 4]): For any joint sub-distribution PA,E on A×E and any normalized distribution QE on E , a
δ-biased ensemble of random variables {WX} on A = Fnq satisfies
EXd2(A|E|PA,E ∗ PWX‖QE) ≤ δ2e−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE). (117)
More precisely,
EXd2(A|E|PA,E ∗ PWX‖QE)
≤δ2d2(A|E|PA,E‖QE). (118)
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The original proof by Dodis and Smith[9] discussed in the case with q = 2. Fehr and Schaffner [10] extended this lemma
to the quantum setting in the case with q = 2. Their proof is based on Fourier analysis and easy to understand. The proof with
a general prime power q is given latter. by generalizing the idea by Fehr and Schaffner [10]. Dodis and Smith[9, Lemma 6]
also considered the case with a general prime power q. They did not explicitly give Proposition 35 and the definition (115)
with a general prime power q.
Proposition 12 essentially coincides with Proposition 35. However, the concept “δ-biased” does not concern a linear random
hash function while the concept “ε-almost dual universality2” does it because the former is defined for the ensemble of
random variables. That is, the latter is a generalization of a universal2 linear hash function while the former does not. Hence,
Proposition 35 cannot directly provide the performance of a linear random hash function. In contrast, Proposition 12 gives
how the privacy amplification by a linear hash function decreases the leaked information. Therefore, in the main part of this
paper, using Proposition 12, we treat the exponential decreasing rate when we apply the privacy amplification by an ε-almost
dual universal2 linear hash function.
Proof of Proposition 12: Due to Lemma 34 and (117), we obtain
EXd2(A|E|PA,E ∗ PWCX ‖QE) ≤ εq−te−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE). (119)
Denoting the quotient class with respect to the subspace C with the representative a ∈ A by [a], we obtain
PA,E ∗ PWC (a, e) =
∑
w∈C
q−tPA,E(a− w, e)
=q−tPA,E([a], e).
Now, we focus on the relation A ∼= A/C × C ∼= fC(A)× C. Then,
PA,E ∗ PWCX (b, w, e) = q−tPfC(A),E(b, e).
Thus,
d2(A|E|PA,E ∗ PWC‖QE)
=q−td2(fC(A)|E|PfC (A),E‖QE)
=q−td2(fC(A)|E|PA,E‖QE). (120)
Therefore, (119) implies
EXq
−td2(fCX(A)|E|PA,E‖QE)
≤εq−te−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE),
which implies (41).
Similarly, Lemma 34, (118), and (120) imply that
EXq
−td2(fCX(A)|E|PA,E‖QE)
≤εq−te−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE).
Since EXd2(fCX(A)|E|PA,E‖QE) = EXe−H2(fCX (A)|E|PA,E‖QE) − 1qn−t eD2(PE‖QE), we have (42).
To start our proof of Proposition 35, we make preparation before our proof of Proposition 35. First, remember that A is a
vector space Fnq and E is a general discrete set. We define the ℓ2 norm over the space L2(A× E) as
‖f‖22 :=
∑
a∈A,e∈E
|f(a, e)|2, ∀f ∈ L2(A× E). (121)
Then, we define the discrete Fourier transform F on L2(A× E) as
F(f)(a′, e) := q−n2
∑
a∈A
ω(a
′·a)
p f(a, e), ∀f ∈ L2(A× E), ∀a′ ∈ A, ∀e ∈ E , (122)
which satisfies ‖Ff‖2 = ‖f‖2. For ∀f, g ∈ L2(A× E), the convolution f ∗ g:
f ∗ g(a, e) :=
∑
a′∈A
f(a− a′, e)g(a′, e). (123)
satisfies
F(f ∗ g)(a, e) = q n2 F(f)(a, e)F(g)(a, e). (124)
We prepare the following lemma.
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Lemma 36: When fPA,E ,QE ∈ L2(A × E) is defined as
fPA,E ,QE (a, e) := PA,E(a, e)QE(e)
− 12 , (125)
we have
‖fPA,E,QE‖22 = e−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE) (126)∑
e∈E
|F(fPA,E ,QE )(0, e)|2 = eD2(PE‖QE) (127)
∑
a 6=0∈Ae∈E
|F(fPA,E ,QE )(a, e)|2 = d2(A|E|PA,E‖QE). (128)
Proof: (126) and (127) are shown as follows.
‖fPA,E ,QE‖22 =
∑
a,e
(PA,E(a, e)QE(e)
− 12 )2 = e−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE)
∑
e∈E
|F(fPA,E ,QE )(0, e)|2 =
∑
e
(
∑
a
PA,E(a, e)QE(e)
− 12 )2 =
∑
e
(PE(e)QE(e)
− 12 )2 = eD2(PE‖QE).
(128) is shown as follows. ∑
a 6=0∈A,e∈E
|F(fPA,E ,QE )(a, e)|2 = ‖F(fPA,E ,QE )‖22 −
∑
e∈E
|F(fPA,E ,QE )(0, e)|2
=‖fPA,E ,QE‖22 −
∑
e∈E
|F(fPA,E ,QE )(0, e)|2
=e−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE) − eD2(PE‖QE) = d2(A|E|PA,E‖QE).
Proof of Proposition 35: Now, we choose gX ∈ L2(A× E) as
gX(a, e) := PWX(a). (129)
Then,
fPA,E ,QE ∗ gX = fPA,E∗PWX ,QE . (130)
The assumption yields that
EX|F(gX)(a, e)|2 = EX|q−n2
∑
a∈A
ω(a
′·a)
p PWX(a)|2 ≤ δ2q−n (131)
for a′ 6= 0 ∈ A. Hence,
EXd2(A|E|PA,E ∗ PWX‖QE)
(a)
= EX
∑
a 6=0∈A,e∈E
|F(fPA,E∗PWX ,QE )(a, e)|2
(b)
=EX
∑
a 6=0∈A,e∈E
|F(fPA,E ,QE ∗ gX)(a, e)|2
(c)
= EX
∑
a 6=0∈A,e∈E
|q n2 F(fPA,E ,QE )(a, e)F(gX)(a, e)|2
(d)
≤δ2EX
∑
a 6=0,e
|F(fPA,E ,QE )(a, e)|2
(e)
= δ2d2(A|E|PA,E‖QE) ≤ δ2e−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE), (132)
which shows (117) and (118). Here, (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) follow from (128), (130), (124), (131), and (128), respectively.
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APPENDIX F
PROOFS OF COMPARISONS OF EXPONENTS
A. Proof of Lemma 27
Inequality (91) can be shown from (15). Lemma 4 yields that
1
2
eI(PA,E |R)
= max
0≤s≤1
s
2
H↓1+s(A|E|PA,E)−
s
2
R
≤ max
0≤s≤1
s
2
H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)−
s
2
R
= max
0≤t≤1/2
t
2(1− t) (H
↑
1
1−t
(A|E|PA,E)−R)
≤ max
0≤t≤1/2
t(H↑1
1−t
(A|E|PA,E)−R) (133)
=ed(PA,E |R),
where t = s1+s , i.e., s =
t
1−t . Inequality (133) follows from the non-negativity of the RHS of (133) and the inequality
1
2(1−t) ≤ 1.
B. Proof of Lemma 29
Lemma 7 implies that
H↑1
1−s
(A|E|PA,E) < H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)
Choosing t = s1+s , we have
max
0≤s
s(H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)−R)
1 + 2s
= max
0≤t≤1
t(H↑1
1−t
(A|E|PA,E)−R)
1 + t
< max
0≤t≤1
t(H↑1+t(A|E|PA,E)−R)
1 + t
,
which implies (97). Similarly, since H1+t(A|E|PA,E) is strictly monotonically increasing with respect to t,
max
0≤s
sH↓1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR
1 + s
= max
0≤t≤1
tH 1
1−t
(A|E|PA,E)− tR
< max
0≤t≤1
tH1+t(A|E|PA,E)− tR,
which implies (98).
When PA|E=e is a uniform distribution for any element e ∈ E , H1+t(A|E|PA,E) and H↑1+t(A|E|PA,E) do not depend on t.
Hence, we obtain max0≤s
s(H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)−R)
1+2s = max0≤t≤1
t(H↑1+t(A|E|PA,E)−R)
1+t =
H(A|E|PA,E)−R
2 and max0≤s
sH↓1+s(A|E|PA,E)−sR
1+s =
max0≤t≤1 tH1+t(A|E|PA,E)− tR = H(A|E|PA,E)−R, which imply the equalities ed(PA,E |R) = e˜d(PA,E |R) and eI(PA,E |R) =
e˜I(PA,E |R).
APPENDIX G
SMOOTHING BOUND OF MIN ENTROPY
A. Proof of (96) of Theorem 28
First, ∆I,min(enR, ε|PnA,E) is the upper bound by the smoothing of min entropy in the modified mutual information criterion
as is mentioned in (67). Using the relation (82) in Theorem 24, we obtain
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log∆I,min(e
nR, ε|PnA,E) ≥ max
0≤s
sH↓1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR
1 + s
. (134)
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Now, we show the opposite inequality. Applying the Crame´r Theorem [35], we obtain
lim
n→∞
−1
n
logPnA,E{(a, e) ∈ An × En|PnA|E(a|e) ≥ 2e−nR
′}
=max
0≤s
sH↓1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR′. (135)
Since sH↓1+s(A|E|PA,E) − sR′ is monotone decreasing with respect to R′ and R′ − R is monotone increasing with respect
to R′, we have
max
R′
min{sH↓1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR′, R′ −R} =
sH↓1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR
1 + s
. (136)
because the solution of sH↓1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR′ = R′ −R with respect to R′ is
sH↓1+s(A|E|PA,E)+R
1+s .
Using the lower bound (74) in Theorem 20 with c = 2, (135), and (136), we have
lim
n→∞
−1
n
logmin
ε>0
(η(ε, nR) + enR−H
↓,ε
min(A|E|PnA,E))
≤ lim
n→∞
−1
n
logmin
R′
η(2PnA,E{(a, e) ∈ An × En|PnA|E(a|e) ≥ e−n2R
′}, log enR) + enRe−nR′
=max
R′
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log η(2PnA,E{(a, e) ∈ An × En|PnA|E(a|e) ≥ e−n2R
′}, log enR) + en(R−R′)
=max
R′
min{ lim
n→∞
−1
n
log η(2PnA,E{(a, e) ∈ An × En|PnA|E(a|e) ≥ e−n2R
′}, log enR), R′ −R}
=max
R′
min{max
0≤s
sH↓1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR′, R′ −R}
=max
R′
max
0≤s
min{sH↓1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR′, R′ −R}
=max
0≤s
max
R′
min{sH↓1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR′, R′ −R}
=max
0≤s
sH↓1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR
1 + s
. (137)
Hence, we obtain (96).
B. Proof of (95) of Theorem 28
The quantity ∆d,min(enR, ε|PnA,E) is the upper bound by smoothing of min entropy in the L1 distinguishability criterion as
is mentioned in (66). Using the relation (81) in Theorem 24, we obtain
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log∆d,min(e
nR, ε|PnA,E) ≥ max
0≤s
sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR
1 + 2s
. (138)
We show the opposite inequality in (95) by using the following lemma. The proof of Lemma 37 will be shown latter.
Lemma 37: The following inequality
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log min
QE,n
PnA,E{(a, e) ∈ An × En|
PnA,E(a, e)
QE,n(e)
≥ 2e−nR′}
≤max
0≤s
sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR′. (139)
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Using (139) in Lemma 37 and the lower bound (72) in Theorem 20 with c = 2, we obtain
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log(min
ǫ2>0
2ǫ1 + e
1
2nRe−
1
2H
↓,ǫ1
min (A|E|PnA))
≤ lim
n→∞
−1
n
log(min
R′
min
QE,n
PnA,E{(a, e) ∈ An × En|
PnA,E(a, e)
QE,n(e)
≥ 2e−nR′}+ e 12n(R−R′))
=max
R′
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log(min
QE,n
PnA,E{(a, e) ∈ An × En|
PnA,E(a, e)
QE,n(e)
≥ 2e−nR′}+ e 12n(R−R′))
=max
R′
min{ lim
n→∞
−1
n
log(min
QE,n
PnA,E{(a, e) ∈ An × En|
PnA,E(a, e)
QE,n(e)
≥ 2e−nR′}), R
′ −R
2
}
≤max
R′
min{max
0≤s
sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR′,
R′ −R
2
}
=max
R′
max
0≤s
min{sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR′,
R′ −R
2
}
=max
0≤s
max
R′
min{sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR′,
R′ −R
2
}. (140)
Further, sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR′ is monotone increasing with respect to R′ and R−R
′
2 is monotone decreasing with respect
to R′. Solving the equation sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR′ = R
′−R
2 with respect to R
′
, we have R′ = 2sH
↑
1+s(A|E|PA,E)+R
1+2s , which
implies that
max
R′
min{sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR′,
R′ −R
2
} = sH
↑
1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR
1 + 2s
.
Thus,
max
0≤s
max
R′
min{sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR′,
R′ −R
2
}
=max
0≤s
sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR
1 + 2s
.
Hence, we obtain (95).
Proof of Lemma 37: We show Lemma 37 by using Lemmas 38 and 40, which will be given latter. For any distribution
QE,n, we define the permutation invariant distribution QE,n,inv by
QE,n,inv(e) :=
∑
g∈Sn
1
n!
QE,n(g(e)),
where Sn is the n-th permutation group and g(e) is the element permuted from e ∈ En by g ∈ Sn. Then, we have
PnA,E{(a, e) ∈ An × En|
PnA,E(a, e)
QE,n(e)
≥ 2e−nR′}
=PnA,E{(a, e) ∈ An × En|PnA,E(a, e) ≥ 2e−nR
′
QE,n(e)}
≥1
2
PnA,E{(a, e) ∈ An × En|PnA,E(a, e) ≥ 4e−nR
′
QE,n,inv(e)}
=
1
2
PnA,E{(a, e) ∈ An × En|
PnA,E(a, e)
QE,n,inv(e)
≥ 4e−nR′},
where the inequality follows from Lemma 38. Here, we denote the set of types of E by Tn,E . For any element QE ∈ Tn,E ,
we denote the uniform distribution over the subset of elements whose type is QE by QˆE . Now, we define the distribution
QE,n,inv,mix(e) :=
1
|Tn,E |
∑
QE∈Tn,E
QˆE(e).
Since QE,n,inv(e) ≤ |Tn,E |QE,n,inv,mix(e), we have
1
2
PnA,E{(a, e) ∈ An × En|PnA,E(a, e) ≥ 4e−nR
′
QE,n,inv(e)}
≥1
2
PnA,E{(a, e) ∈ An × En|PnA,E(a, e) ≥ 4|Tn,E |e−nR
′
QE,n,inv,mix(e)}.
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For given sequence (a, e) ∈ A×E , we denote the type of (a, e) by P ′A,E and its marginal distribution over E of P ′A,E by P ′E .
Then, PnA,E(a, e) = e−n(D(P
′
A,E‖PA,E)+H(P ′A,E)) and |Tn,E |QE,n,inv,mix(e) = e−nH(P ′E). That is, the condition PnA,E(a, e) ≥
4|Tn,E |e−nR′QE,n,inv,mix(e) is equivalent to the condition D(P ′A,E‖PA,E) +H(P ′A,E) ≤ log 4n +H(P ′E) +R′. We denote the
set of sequences whose types are P ′A,E by TPA,E′ . Hence,
1
2
PnA,E{(a, e) ∈ An × En|PnA,E(a, e) ≥ 4|Tn,E |e−nR
′
QE,n,inv,mix(e)}
=
∑
P ′A,E∈Tn,A×E :D(P ′A,E‖PA,E)+H(P ′A,E)≤ log 4n +H(P ′E)+R′
1
2
PnA,E(TPA,E′ )
≥ max
P ′A,E∈Tn,A×E :D(P ′A,E‖PA,E)+H(P ′A,E)≤ log 4n +H(P ′E)+R′
1
2
PnA,E(TP ′A,E ).
Since PnA,E(TP ′A,E ) ∼= e−nD(P
′
A,E‖PA,E), taking the limit, we have
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log
1
2
PnA,E{(a, e) ∈ An × En|PnA,E(a, e) ≥ 4|Tn,E |e−nR
′
QE,n,inv,mix(e)}
≤max
P ′A,E
{D(P ′A,E‖PA,E)|D(P ′A,E‖PA,E) +H(P ′A,E) ≤ R′ +H(P ′E)}
=max
P ′A,E
{D(P ′A,E‖PA,E)|D(P ′A,E‖PA,E) +H(A|E|P ′A,E) ≤ R′}.
Hence, combining Lemma 40, we obtain (139).
Lemma 38: The relation
PnA{a ∈ An|c ≥ f(a)} ≥
1
2
Pmix,A{a ∈ An|c ≥ 1
n!
∑
g∈Sn
f(g(a))} (141)
holds for any function f .
Proof: Lemma 38 can be shown by applying Lemma 39 to all of distributions conditioned with type.
Lemma 39: The relation
Pmix,A{a|c ≥ f(a)} ≥ 1
2
Pmix,A{a|c ≥ 1|A|
∑
a
f(a)} (142)
holds for any function f .
Proof: Markov inequality implies that
Pmix,A{a|c < f(a)} ≤ 1
c
1
|A|
∑
a
f(a).
When c ≥ 2|A|
∑
a f(a), 1− 1c 1|A|
∑
a f(a) is greater than
1
2 . Hence,
Pmix,A{a|c ≥ f(a)} = 1− Pmix,A{a|c < f(a)} ≥ 1− 1
c
1
|A|
∑
a
f(a) ≥ 1
2
Pmix,A {a|c ≥ 2|A|
∑
a
f(a)}.
Lemma 40: The relation
min
P ′A,E
{D(P ′A,E‖PA,E)|D(P ′A,E‖PA,E) +H(A|E|P ′A,E) ≤ R′}
=max
0≤s
sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR′. (143)
holds.
Proof: We show Lemma 40 by using Lemma 33, which will be given latter. We employ a generalization of the method
used in [61, Appendix D]. First, we define the distribution PA,E;s as
PA,E;s(a, e) :=
PA|E(a|e)1+sPE(e)
(
∑
a PA|E(a|e)1+s)
s
1+s (
∑
e PE(e)(
∑
a PA|E(a|e)1+s)
1
1+s )
.
That is, we have
PA|E;s(a|e) =
PA|E(a|e)1+s∑
a PA|E(a|e)1+s
PE;s(e) =
PE(e)(
∑
a PA|E(a|e)1+s)
1
1+s
(
∑
e PE(e)(
∑
a PA|E(a|e)1+s)
1
1+s )
.
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Hence,
D(PA,E;s‖PA,E)
=
∑
a,e
PA,E;s(a, e)
(
s logPA|E(a|e)−
s
1 + s
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
) s
1 + s
H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E),
H(A|E|PA,E;s)
=
∑
a,e
PA,E;s(a, e)
(
−(1 + s) logPA|E(a|e) + log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
)
D(PA,E;s‖PA,E) +H(A|E|PA,E;s),
=
∑
a,e
PA,E;s(a, e)
(
− logPA|E(a|e) +
1
1 + s
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
) s
1 + s
H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E).
Given s ≥ 0, we choose an arbitrary distribution P ′A,E such that
D(PA,Es ‖PA,E) = D(P ′A,E‖PA,E).
Since
D(P ′A,E‖PA,E) =
∑
a,e
P ′A,E(a, e)
(
logP ′A,E(a, e)− logPA,E(a, e)
)
D(P ′A,E‖PA,Es ) =
∑
a,e
P ′A,E(a, e)
(
logP ′A,E(a, e)−−(1 + s) logPA|E(a|e)− logPE(e)
+
s
1 + s
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)−
s
1 + s
H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)
)
,
we have
D(P ′A,E‖PA,E;s) = D(P ′A,E‖PA,E;s) +D(PA,E;s‖PA,E)−D(P ′A,E‖PA,E)
=
∑
a,e
PA,E;s(a, e)
(
s logPA|E(a|e)−
s
1 + s
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
) s
1 + s
H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)
−
∑
a,e
P ′A,E(a, e)
(
s logPA|E(a|e)−
s
1 + s
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
)
− s
1 + s
H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)
=
∑
a,e
(PA,E;s(a, e)− P ′A,E(a, e))
(
s logPA|E(a|e)−
s
1 + s
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
)
.
Hence,
H(A|E|PA,E;s)−H(A|E|P ′A,E) +D(P ′E‖PE;s)
=H(A|E|PA,E;s) +D(PA,E;s‖PA,E)− (H(A|E|P ′A,E)−D(P ′A,E‖PA,E)) +D(P ′E‖PE;s)
=
∑
a,e
PA,E;s(a, e)
(
− logPA|E(a|e) +
1
1 + s
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
)
+
s
1 + s
H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)
−
∑
a,e
P ′A,E(a, e)
(
− logPA|E(a|e) +
1
1 + s
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
)
+
s
1 + s
H↑1+s(A|E|PA,E)
=
∑
a,e
(PA,E;s(a, e)− P ′A,E(a, e))
(
− logPA|E(a|e) +
1
1 + s
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s)
)
=− sD(P ′A,E‖PA,E;s) ≤ 0.
Since D(P ′E‖PE;s) ≥ 0, we have H(A|E|PA,E;s) ≤ H(A|E|P ′A,E), which implies
H(A|E|PA,E;s) +D(PA,E;s‖PA,E) ≤ H(A|E|P ′A,E) +D(P ′A,E‖PA,E).
Since the map s 7→ D(PA,E;s‖PA,E) is continuous, we have
min
P ′A,E
{D(P ′A,E‖PA,E)|D(P ′A,E‖PA,E) +H(A|E|P ′A,E) ≤ R′}
=min
s≥0
{D(PA,E;s‖PA,E)|D(PA,E;s‖PA,E) +H(A|E|PA,E;s) ≤ R′}.
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Now, we choose s0 ≥ 0 such that
D(PA,Es0 ‖PA,E) +H(A|E|PA,Es0 )
=
∑
a,e
PA,Es0 (a, e)
(
− logPA|E(a|e) +
1
1 + s0
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s0)
)
+
s0
1 + s0
H↑1+s0(A|E|PA,E)
=R′,
which implies that
∑
a,e
PA,Es0 (a, e)
(
− logPA|E(a|e) +
1
1 + s0
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s0 )
)
= R′ − s0
1 + s0
H↑1+s0(A|E|PA,E).
Then,
min
s≥0
{D(PA,E;s‖PA,E)|D(PA,E;s‖PA,E) +H(A|E|PA,E;s) ≤ R′}
=
∑
a,e
PA,Es0 (a, e)
(
s0 logPA|E(a|e)−
s0
1 + s0
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s0)
)
+
s0
1 + s0
H↑1+s0(A|E|PA,E)
=− s0
∑
a,e
PA,Es0 (a, e)
(
− logPA|E(a|e) +
1
1 + s0
log(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s0)
)
+
s0
1 + s0
H↑1+s0(A|E|PA,E)
=− s0(R′ + φ( s0
1 + s0
|A|E|PA,E)) + s0
1 + s0
H↑1+s0(A|E|PA,E)
=− s0R′ + s0H↑1+s0(A|E|PA,E)
=max
s≥0
−sR′ + sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E),
where the reason of the equation is the following. Due to Lemma 33, the function s 7→ −sH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E) is convex, and
−R′ = − ddssH↑1+s(A|E|PA,E). Then, we obtain (143).
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